



Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

21 August 2026

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

The next issue will be on 04 September 2026.

Quick links:

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RUSI(NS) LinkedIn Page

We are excited to announce our LinkedIn Page: <https://www.linkedin.com/groups/19653001>

You all are cordially invited to join this public group, and being public, we also encourage non-members to join the RUSI(NS) LinkedIn. Stay connected, contribute and receive updated information.

Members are requested to please email their content to:

Cdr (ret'd) Ian Wood, Group Page Administrator, ian@idhwood.ca

Writing for RUSI(NS)

The content of *Dispatches* and other RUSI(NS) channels is representative of the submissions by RUSI(NS) members. If you want more published about certain fields and topics, you are encouraged to submit material to RUSIDispatches@gmail.com and RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. The public face of RUSI(NS) is what we, the membership, makes it.



Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media

You are encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X, Facebook and LinkedIn accounts. For X and Facebook, email to rusinsdispatches@gmail.com. For LinkedIn, email to Cdr (ret'd) Ian Wood, Group Page Administrator, at ian@idhwood.ca. Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for the X and Facebook accounts in order to keep them active.

RUSI(NS) Website

Our website has been down for some time since the program which supports it was hacked, coincidentally and unfortunately with our backup server frying (that's an IT term). Use of AI by hackers is making re-establishing our account challenging. There is no ETR ATT. Anyone trying to contact RUSI(NS) can do so by emailing RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com.

Events

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

RUSI(NS) Events: August-December 2026

- August - Nil;
- September - **22 September, Tuesday**, Joint CIC/RUSI(NS) Dinner, Cunard Centre, details to follow;
- **24 September, Thursday**, 1300 hrs (Atlantic Time), Cdr Mathew Arthur, CO Advanced Naval Capabilities Unit, Virtual Presentation on "The RCN and the Drones";

- October - **5 October, Monday**, Crista-Lynn Ferguson, Director General Fighter Capability, RCAF, Focus Talk on “RCAF Future Fighter Lead-In Training”;
- Naval Modernization Program, TBC;
- November - **4 November, Wednesday**, Remembrance Dinner, RA Park;
- NORAD Modernization, details date TBC;
- December - **3 December, Thursday**, Presentation RCAF Modernization, 1300 hrs, Mighty Maroon Room, TBC;
- **10 December, Thursday**, Winter/Holiday Meet and Greet, RA Park.

Proposed Presentations and Events for 2027:

- a. CCG Aircraft Service Delivery, tentative January 27
- b. Industry Canada Update discussion group or presentation, February 2027
- c. CBSA Intelligence Centre, March 27
- d. Irving Shipbuilding Industries, April 27
- e. The Future of maritime Air, May 27
- f. Naval Modernization/Corvette Program, June 27
- g. Canadian Tactical Helo program, September 27
- h. Army of the Future/Equipment Update, October 27
- i. Naval Mine Warfare / Advanced Naval Capabilities, TBC
- j. Canada’s International Defence Commitments, TBC
- k. Canada’s Commercial Fleet/ Modernization/rebuild? TBC
- l. Sanctions Development and Implementation discussion group
- m. Arctic Security Discussion Group
- n. OSINT Discussion Group
- o European Joint Task Force - Should Canada Join? discussion group
- p. Tour Irving Shipbuilding, TBC
- q. Army Reorg Update, Inflection Point 2025
- r. Canada’s Drone Program Update.

It should be noted that these are all proposals and are subject to change. New ideas and concepts are welcome to next year’s program. The dates shown are aspirational.

New: 22 September, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation “Build Excel War Gaming Tools.” 7-8:30 pm ADT, online. For more information and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/build-excel-war-gaming-tools-tickets-1998349760929?>

New: 20 October, Tuesday - Georgetown University Wargaming Society presentation “Wargaming in the French Army: Duel Tactique” 1-2:30 pm ADT, online. For more information and to register: <https://www.eventbrite.com/e/wargaming-in-the-french-army-duel-tactique-tickets-1994937648208>

Wargaming Events: Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule: <https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents>

Publications

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of *Dispatches* from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

Weekly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*
Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News*

Bi-weekly:

Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*
<https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current>

Monthly:

Canadian Gunner News
Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*
Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*
Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*
Royal Canadian Logistics Service *The Logistician*
Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*
Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*
Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute!*

Quarterly:

Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Australia

There are links on the RUSI-A home page (<https://www.rusi.org.au/>) to the seven branches across Australia, including New South Wales whose newsletter is also listed below:

RUSI-A United Service (quarterly): <https://rusi.au/Publications.php#Journal>

RUSI-A Newsletter (weekly): <https://rusi.au/Newsletters.php>

RUSI-NSW Newsletter (weekly): <https://rusinsw.au/site/Newsletters.php>

RUSI-A monographs: <https://rusi.au/Monographs.php>

RUSI-A lectures: <https://rusi.au/Videos/Videos.php>

RUSI-A podcasts: https://rusi.au/SIG_S/Strategy.php

Last Week in Canadian History:

- On 10 August 1941, US President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill have their second meeting at Placentia, Newfoundland aboard the USS *Augusta*; four days later they will issue the Atlantic Charter setting forth eight goals for the world; a document that will serve as the basis for the United Nations Charter.

- 12 August 1814, Capt (RN) Alexander Hobbs, commanding 70 seamen and marines, attacks three U.S. armed schooners supporting Major General Jacob Brown's Fort Erie campaign; masquerading American supply boats, the British board and seize USS *Somers* and USS *Ohio* while USS *Porcupine* escapes; the vessels are renamed *Huron* and *Sauk*; last naval engagement on Lake Erie in the war.

@RUSI_NS on X 

To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

"Cold Spray Metal #3Dprinting Goes to Sea at #RIMPAC 2026"

<https://marinelink.com/news/cold-spray-metal-d-printing-goes-sea-542225> @RoyalCanNavy

replenishment oilers not just supply ships, are floating forward workshops. Advanced manufacturing will enhance use

@FederalFleet @OfficialSPEE3D H/T @ShipNews



** Policy Hawk @CDNPolicyHawk 12 Aug posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:**

Canada is acquiring Airborne Early Warning aircraft at a time when the United States is pivoting to space-based alternatives.

Are we making a mistake by investing in old technology? Or do our needs and priorities simply differ from theirs?

I explore this topic in a new piece that's exclusive to Vanguard Magazine. You can read it in the magazine when it comes out (tomorrow?), or you can access it early through the link below.

(Different Problems, Different Tools: Canada's AEW&C Bet in a Space Age

<https://www.vanguarddefence.ca/p/different-problems-different-tools-canada-s-aew-c-bet-in-a-space-age>)



Murray Brewster @Murray_Brewster Aug 8 posted:

Snow Dragons in the Arctic: Canada, U.S. Shadow Chinese Research Ships #cdnpoli #Arctic #China #US (Canada, U.S. shadow Chinese research ships in the Arctic as concern grows over Snow Dragons' presence <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/china-canada-us-arctic-research-ships-snow-dragons-9.7299939>)



RUSI(NS) quoted:

Operation LATITUDE = @CanadianForces & @CoastGuardCAN conduct multi-domain

operations in #Arctic in support of continental defence in cooperation with US forces, enhancing awareness & interoperability #OpLATITUDE

IRJ @railjournal 10 Aug posted:

Systra is leading a study to assess potential capacity enhancements on the Hudson Bay Railway in Manitoba, Canada.

(Hudson Bay Railway improvement study underway
<https://www.railjournal.com/infrastructure/hudson-bay-railway-improvement-study-underway/>)




RUSI(NS) quoted:

Might @CanadianForces consider creating a @CanadianArmy Reserve railway capability to support response to domestic emergencies (eg thru #ChurchillMB to #Arctic) & to deploy overseas to #Railway Line of Communication during major combat operations?

@RoyalCanNavy trialed metal #3D printing aboard replenishment oiler ASTERIX during Exercise Rim of the Pacific #RIMPAC'26

<https://www.facebook.com/federalfleet/posts/pfbid0RRHi1tBXGdvjQsDa1MiP3iFw3YL5zmiK1tvRpNXrz9PNPbrFzK1THySwHpbtZzwfl>



SPEE3D's containerized Expeditionary Manufacturing Unit allows forward deployed advanced manufacturing @federalfleet @OfficialSPEE3D

NOAH @NoahGairn 5 Aug posted:

Royal Canadian Navy Showcases First Look at Canadian UAVS Textron Aerosonde UAS On Max Bernays

<https://open.substack.com/pub/truenorthstrategicreview/p/royal-canadian-navy-showcases-first>



RUSI(NS) reposted:

Quietly, @RoyalCanNavy is trialling/developing capability of warships incl #Arctic&Offshore Patrol Vessels to operate #UxS #drones. Great augmentation to ship: surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, logistics, weapon delivery.

Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook

To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).

Other Sources

#Arctic #Canada # Critical Minerals

“Canada’s Critical Minerals Moment: Time to Build”,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PyHxxIpflCA>

#Arctic #USA #environment

Trump cancelling the National Oceanic Atmospheric Association (NOAA) annual Arctic Report Card – it’s a big deal:

<https://arctic.noaa.gov/report-card/> & <https://arctic.noaa.gov/report-card/report-card-2025/>;
<https://www.arctictoday.com/trump-administration-ends-noaa-support-for-annual-arctic-report-card/>;

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2PF6uk3tqA&time_continue=3&source_ve_path=NzY3NTg&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fhubblecontent.svc.cloud.microsoft%2F

Alternative sources for Arctic environmental data after NOAA Arctic Report Card?

The Arctic Portal provides additional Arctic environmental data and resources, including news, articles, maps, and images, with proper citation required when reusing content.

<https://arcticportal.org/climate-change-and-sea-ice-portlet/sea-ice/arctic-report-card>

#artificial intelligence

OpenAI’s AI agents hacked another company. Then it got worse.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INpVD65s8mA&list=TLPQMTcwODIwMjZtSaloueQTzw&index=2>

From an IT colleague: An excellent presentation on how AI is developing and how dangerous it is ... and soon could be.

Canada’s Halifax-Class Frigate: More dangerous than it looks

<https://youtu.be/68ucjcaKoQM?si=i-XhIgPznCkOEoz>

#Canadian Armed Forces

Thanks to Ukraine, Canada Wants the Weapon That Comes After HIMARS

<https://www.wesodonnell.com/p/thanks-to-ukraine-canada-wants-the>

#Canadian Army

Small Update On The Canadian Deep Precision Strike Capability Initiative

<https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/small-update-on-the-canadian-deep>

#command #drones #Russia-Ukraine War

Drones Have Changed the Battlefield—They Have Not Solved the Command Problem

<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/drones-have-changed-the-battlefield-they-have-not-solved-the-command-problem/>

Cyber Intelligence

AI's just commit felonies now

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L2ehWbxphKc>

In the last month North Korean hackers have been in the security news a lot. Below are a few samples of their activity.

North Korean spies are running local LLMs to cause AI mischief

<https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/08/10/north-korean-spies-are-running-local-llms-to-cause-ai-mischief/5285632>

The scale of PurpleDelta's operation is easy to miss': Fake North Korean IT workers are submitting so many job applications that companies can't keep up

<https://www.itpro.com/security/cyber-attacks/the-scale-of-purpledet-kltas-operation-is-easy-to-miss-fake-north-korean-it-workers-are-submitting-so-many-job-applications-that-companies-caneep-up>

The hackers from North Korea don't always win ...

Researchers Built a Fake Crypto Startup and Hired Three Suspected North Korean IT Workers

<https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/researchers-built-fake-crypto-startup.html? m=3n%2e009a%2e4053%2exi0ao0b2aq%2e33yj>

#drones #Canadian Armed Forces

Canada military tests drones at manufacturers event

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/article/canadian-armed-forces-holds-major-drone-testing-event-with-manufacturers/>

Canadian Joint Forces Command staff were asked about the background of the name 'RED COBALT' for the Uncrewed Systems (UxS) Accelerator 2026. Staff advised that it was not intended for anything to be read into it, and it's a fairly random name with a structure that will enable a series of events under the same theme to be built in the future.

#legal

Strait of Hormuz Tests the Limits of the Law of the Sea

<https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/op-ed-strait-of-hormuz-tests-the-limits-of-the-law-of-the-sea>

#Royal Canadian Navy

National Defence rules out artificial reefs for retired warships as decommissioning underway

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/vancouver/article/national-defence-rules-out-artificial-reefs-for-retired-warships-as-decommissioning-underway/>

Some issues with this otherwise excellent article:

1. Canadian warships are not 'decommissioned' but are 'paid off.' To commission a ship means to order (as 'order' is what 'commission' means, such as 'commission a painting') a naval officer to take command and put the ship into active service. The French for commission – 'mettre en service' or 'prendre en service' - is clearer on that. When talking/writing about a commissioned ship, it means a ship that has gone through a commissioning process/ceremony but it is the naval officer who has been ordered. Each Captain's Ship's Book has a page with multiple rows for the commission column, each row for a new commanding officer. Admittedly, even 'paying off' refers to the ship's company/crew and not the ship - the ship goes into refit/maintenance or reserve ('ordinary' in historical terms but that is not used anymore) or for disposal. (Aside: On the other hand, the USN uses commissioning and decommissioning to refer to the ship. They also have multiple kinds of commission.).

2. Warships don't retire (people do), they are disposed. When going for disposal, a ship can be sent to a ship breaker for breaking up (commonly but incorrectly referred to as scrapping or recycling - these happen after/as part of being broken up), made into a museum, sunk as artificial reef or used as a weapons target.

3. The Kingston-class ships, typed as MM (mine warfare vessel - general purpose), had their minesweeping ('Osprey') equipment removed decades ago. In recent years, they have operated as mine counter-measures (MCM) vessels, employing divers and surface and underwater uncrewed systems ('drones'). Often and colloquially, even within the RCN, they have been called Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) but that is the project title, not an official/NATO ship type - the project closed decades ago.

Frequently, even official releases use incorrect language, possibly reflective of not being written by communications staff with naval backgrounds.

#Russia-Ukraine War #electronic warfare

<https://www.mattvw.com/post/the-return-of-the-essential-art-electronic-warfare-and-the-lessons-of-the-russia-ukraine-war>

"In Ukraine, EW isn't an adjunct to maneuver or fires. It's inseparable from them."

#security

Liberals blow past deadline to review major national security law

<https://globalnews.ca/news/12018304/liberals-miss-national-security-review-deadline/>

#3D printing

Marines Learn to 3D Print Raiding Craft, Attack Drones in the Western Pacific

<https://news.usni.org/2026/08/10/marines-learn-to-3d-print-raiding-craft-attack-drones-in-the-western-pacific>

Cool experimentation: "Marines are learning how to 3D print raiding craft and attack drones..."

#warfare #drones

The drone age demands a new theory of military protection

<https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-drone-age-demands-a-new-theory-of-military-protection/>

“Rather than ensuring every platform survives, commanders may increasingly accept that many autonomous systems will be lost, provided that enough complete the mission and enough capability can be regenerated quickly enough to sustain operations.”

#wargaming

Wargaming Deception Working Group Report

<https://paxsims.wordpress.com/2025/01/12/wargaming-deception-working-group-report/>

Odds and Sods

#camouflage

OSINTtechnical @Osinttechnical 11 Aug posted

(<https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2087197683026972967>): Russian cargo ships have begun sporting naval “dazzle” camouflage in the Black Sea after numerous Ukrainian drone strikes.



More at: Russians employ drastic camouflage tactics (<https://www.haberdemizde.com/denizde-gundem/ruslardan-kirici-kamuflej-onlemi/>) (you have to have a browser that translates Turkish to English).

Department of National Defense/ Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada Media Advisory, 17 August, 2026

Canada to co-host the 28th Annual Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference at the Victoria Conference Centre, Victoria, BC, Canada, from August 31 to September 2, 2026. The conference will be co-hosted by Canada’s Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jennie Carignan, and the Commander of United States (U.S.) Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel J. Paparo.

This year’s theme, “Strengthening Collective Security: Navigating Challenges in a Dynamic Indo-Pacific Landscape” will bring together senior military leaders, practitioners and regional experts to discuss regional security issues, including non-defence and non-military perspectives.

A total of 32 countries have been invited to participate this year. Held annually since 1998, the conference brings together senior military leaders from across the Indo-Pacific to strengthen mutual understanding, cooperation and interoperability among allies and partners.

Department of National Defense, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario

News Release, 17 August 2026: HMCS *Charlottetown* returns from Operations HORIZON and NEON

Today, His Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Charlottetown* returned to Halifax, Nova Scotia, following a six-month deployment from February to August 2026 to the Indo-Pacific region in support of Operations HORIZON and NEON.

While deployed, HMCS *Charlottetown* strengthened interoperability with 15 allied and partner nations through multinational exercises such as KAKADU, BALIKATAN, and VALIANT SHIELD, cooperative engagements, and maritime security activities, including a range of maritime, aviation, and diving operations.

The deployment demonstrated the Royal Canadian Navy's ability to deploy and sustain combat-ready forces globally, alongside allies and partners, strengthening regional security and reaffirming Canada's commitment to a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

News Release, 14 August 2026: Canadian Armed Forces launch Operation NANOOK-TUUGAALIK in Canada's Arctic

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have launched Operation NANOOK-TUUGAALIK, a serial of Operation NANOOK running from August through October that focuses on maintaining a maritime presence in the Arctic, enhancing regional awareness, and strengthening the CAF's ability to operate effectively in remote northern environments.

During the operation, His Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS) *Robert Hampton Gray* will be joined by the Canadian Coast Guard and other Canadian government departments as well as naval forces from the United States, France, and Denmark, as they transit through waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago conducting activities including patrols, surveillance, community engagement, and refuelling. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied participation will strengthen interoperability and shared maritime awareness in the region.

“Operation NANOOK-TUUGAALIK demonstrates how Canada works effectively with allies and partners in the Arctic maritime domain. OP NANOOK is the Canadian Armed Forces’ operation to detect activities across waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, to deter actors from challenging Canadian sovereignty and be postured to defend it.”

Military Strategy Magazine Special Edition “War on the Waves: Lessons on Naval Military History and Strategy”

<https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/special-editions/war-on-the-waves-lessons-on-naval-military-history-and-strategy/>

contents:

Strategic Adaptation Under Fire: U.S. Carrier Aviation and the Institutional Learning Curve, 1929–1944

Adaptation in Ambiguity: The Battle of Cape Esperance, 11-12 October 1942

Dilemmas, Dilemmas: The Frustrations of Late-Imperial Chinese Naval Strategy

The Best-Laid Plans of the British Navy, 1783–1794

HMAS Australia, Australian Maritime Strategy, and the AUKUS Agreement

Was the Battle of Midway Won or Lost? Considerations for Strategists

“What’s My Age Again?” German Naval Strategy – The First 175/70 Years

“History is the only body of evidence that informs military strategy. Carl told us that strategy was the use of engagements for the objects of the war. Nothing about being at sea makes that less true.”

THE GLOBE AND MAIL PRESENTS

National Defence:

Mapping Canada's growth strategy



REQUEST TO ATTEND IN PERSON
VIRTUAL ATTENDANCE: FREE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 2026 | 1:30 P.M. – 5:00 P.M. ET
ATTEND VIRTUALLY: 2:00 P.M. – 4:00 P.M. ET
NATIONAL ARTS CENTRE, 1 ELGIN STREET, ROSSY PAVILION, OTTAWA

Submitting a request does not guarantee attendance. You will be notified within one week if your in-person attendance is confirmed or waitlisted.

Federal plans to increase defence spending to five percent of GDP by 2035 could translate into as much as \$150 billion in annual investment. Delivering on this ambition will depend on funding, but also on speed, industrial capacity, global partnerships and procurement strategies that prioritize Canadian industry.

At this pivotal moment for Canada, The Globe and Mail will convene defence leaders, policymakers, and industry experts to discuss the actions needed now to scale capabilities, accelerate delivery and support our nation's safety and security.

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J.P.Morgan

Naval Association Canada (NAC) News, 12-25 June, Selected Information

Canada :

[Canada, U.S. shadow Chinese research ships in the Arctic as concern grows over Snow Dragons' presence; Chinese Operators Gear Up for Busy Arctic Shipping Season](#) however [Arctic Ice Damages Tanker as Russia Ramps Up Northern Sea Route Oil Shipments](#)

The World:

[Rosatom Says Seven Chinese Vessels Will Sail to Europe via Russia's Arctic Route](#)

[Russia's "Derzhava" sneaks into Norwegian waters](#)

[Trump Opens Door to Foreign-Built Warships in Major Navy Shipbuilding Overhaul](#)

**Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) International Outlook, 14-19 August, 2026
Selected Information**

Canada:

["Canadian-Led Operation Reveals Scope of Illegal Fishing in North Pacific"](#)

The World:

["China-linked hackers hit Taiwan in unprecedented 'autonomous' AI cyber attack"](#)

["Tokyo condemns visit by Vladimir Putin to disputed Kuril Islands"](#)

["Panama Canal Cuts Draft for Largest Ships as El Niño Intensifies"](#)

["Russia using North Korean missiles to strike Ukraine, Zelensky says"](#)


["After killing hundreds in boat strikes, US military expands campaign on land in Latin America"](#); ["Trump orders Pentagon to cut back military exercises with South Korea"](#)

["Việt Nam launches construction of largest, most advanced domestically built anti-submarine frigate"](#)

The Canadian Strike Complex

A hypothetical representation of the strike portion of a future Canadian Deep Sense-Strike Complex. The goal: a layered, multi-domain, multi-platform strike complex providing Canada with both land and maritime strike from 1 km to 2,000 km. Compiled from operational, ordered, and planned munitions.

All entries subject to change. Not an official document — for speculative and hypothetical purposes only.



Log scale. Reach shown to maximum cited range. Official specifications where published; open-source estimates elsewhere. All figures profile-dependent. Excluded but planned or possible: 35M Tyrfin (800–1,000 km class, mid-2030s), Future Long-Range Strike, Future Long-Range Maritime Strike, and Hypersonics. DDIM is a broad initiative expected to span multiple procurements; the range shown is an envelope across candidate systems, not a single weapon's reach.

Issues to Watch

1. Observation on World Affairs

- Canada-Domestic and External Situations; Trump and Tariffs
- US-Iran Conflict including Bab al Mandab
- East Europe-Moldova, Georgia and Belarus
- Israel-Iranian Proxies
- Russia-Ukraine Conflict
- China-South China Sea; India and Pakistan and Pak's role in China supporting Iran against the US

O Canada

On 19 August listed at 50% will be imposed, US Tariffs on a large variety of Canadian products that appear to be deliberately designed to attack Canadian businesses. Canadian businesses tend to be small to medium size. It is an attempt to divide elements of Canadian society against each other and to cause general mayhem in the Canadian economy.

These are not trade talks at all and one wonders if our trade negotiators understand that this is about the American ability to impose their will upon what the Trump regime apparently see as a client and even perhaps a vassal state. The obscene "Donroe" doctrine sets international relations back to the 19th century. The Trump Administration is largely uneducated in the most basic economic facts and are willing to damage the average US citizen to fulfill their rather strange and often incompetent actions. Canada has a tightrope to walk. The administration's action makes little sense, and they have inflicted massive damage across the globe.

Speaking of the world, many are watching what Canada does next if the tariffs are imposed. Our actions or non-actions will have an impact on our own country but others as we have been held out as an example for everyone dealing with the Trump Regime. Let's hope our leadership makes the right decisions.

Canada is a symbol of independence and belief in a fair system of international trade and economy. It also is a symbol of independence that the Trump Administration has problems with as an opposition to their warped values.

The current government has posited the idea of developing a 300 k "militia" to spend one week of training on basic skill sets to enable them to do limited tasks during a national emergency. Some of the countries such as Finland, Switzerland have more developed systems, but Canada is looking to other countries for a model.

Canada used to have a similar system of sorts in the time period of 1939 until the mid-sixties which included a large number of citizens. In the Second World War from 1939 until 1945 as many as 280 k formed part of this organization. It was mainly organized to be ready for air

attacks and was oriented to the provision of shelters, light discipline including black outs and other civil emergencies as required. The program essentially ended with the development of large nuclear weapons which made shelters and evacuation redundant as overall survival was impractical hope.

The idea of having hundreds of thousands trained for emergencies may be revisited not against nuclear weapons survival but for domestic emergencies due to climate change including support to fire fighting, emergency first aid with CPR, basic weapons safety, practical use of chainsaws, vehicle driving, food distribution, manning water points of potable water, basic civil radio procedures. In other words, this gives an opportunity to create better citizens as well as be better prepared for domestic emergencies.

Rise of anti-Semitism. 71% of hate crimes are against Jews in Canada. One hopes the rest goes without saying, however some Liberal politicians have been quoted about the change in demographics. There are only around 350K Jewish citizens based against 1.78 M Muslims, one being Minister Joly. It is a crass mercenary position against what is clearly an increasingly major problem.

One last point, the US has tried to get a decision in favour of the purchase of the F 35. It is a good aircraft and is actually a flying computer. There have been complaints that it cannot “dog fight” but that is not its purpose. It doesn’t dog fight because it has the capacity to destroy enemy aircraft/ cruise missiles or ground targets from a long distance away. It is also merely one piece of a new type of military architecture which has a vast number of interrelated systems and weapons to put the ammunition in the right place at the right time. It is a system that works. Maintenance is a problem, but countries that have had the aircraft for a while are capable of keeping most of the fleet operational. Can it do all things, no it cannot and it is delicate in regard to its airfield requirements, but it is still the very best option. The RCAF deserves the best it can get despite the current political issues with the US. We might consider a mixed fleet to increase numbers and the Gripen is a good fit.

United States

Issues with US carrier deployments as typified by the circumstances of the USS Abraham Lincoln. More than 250 days at sea with a deteriorating administrative situation.

Ongoing tariff issues around the world. One has to wonder what the US thinks it will get from their crude tariff actions except contempt. This has been counter-productive at best.

Affordability. Remains the single biggest issue in the midterm elections. The Trump administration has achieved an approval rating of only three in ten Americans with nearly seven in ten expressing disapproval. Not a good sign for Trump.

Moldova

Moldova assisted Ukraine by using their rail system to move large quantities of wheat and grains to market after Russia targeted vessels using Ukrainian ports.

Drone flew over Moldova and was shot down in Romania. Moldova is making efforts to acquire some anti-drone capability. In order to reinforce this requirement, a Russian drone exploded near the capital Chisinau on 17 August 2026.

Georgia

Georgia's only refinery has been sanctioned because it was selling finished petroleum products to Russia the past two weeks.

Daily demonstrations continue but security forces have been careful not to cause too much trouble and have basically stood back allowing demonstrations to occur. Their actions normally take place after events when security forces arrest agitators at night with few people around. A tried-and-true method of authoritarian regimes. Russia has been unable to provide any extra security forces due to their own issues within the Russian Federation. Russian security forces are down nearly 30% of their normal establishment due to better pay in the Army. Short term gain for long term pain eventually.

Belarus

Belarus' Novopolotsk Oil Refinery will undergo normal annual maintenance in August-September timeframe. This refinery is providing up to 165 k tons of petroleum products to Russia while Russia's plants are offline due to Ukrainian strikes. The loss of a major source of petroleum products at this time will have an impact on Russian gasoline and diesel supplies this September. All three Belarus refineries are under Western sanctions as a result.

On 8 August, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya warned attendees at the "New Belarus Conference" held in Warsaw Poland, that although she appreciated both the French and US governments assistance in freeing political prisoners; she also warned against normalizing and legitimizing the Lukashenko regime. The information was gathered from Polskie Radio on 8 August 2026.

The Belarus opposition and the leadership in Ukraine have been drawing closer with visits by both sides to the secure area in Vilnius and a reciprocal visit by opposition leadership to Kyiv. They both share concerns about US intentions at this point. A US representative, John Coale arranged the release of political prisoners, and the US lowered some sanctions against the Lukashenko regime.

Israel-Iran-US Conflict

The link below gives a reasonably detailed view of various factions that are supported by Iran throughout the Middle East. For Israel the continued existence of these organizations is existential and non-negotiable despite pressure from the international community and even the US.

<https://www.msn.com/en-ca/news/other/the-hidden-armies-of-the-middle-east/vi-AA27j31l?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=6a7c480fa50c411bbfdcd486527fd197&cvpid=1cb3c4b8cc4a4a5398d880ed355983dd&ei=247>

The Iran-US conflict is ongoing and there are some fairly consistent rumblings of a ground assault into the area of the Straits of Hormuz or areas that could create major economic difficulties for Iran. Is it possible? Maybe, but the terrain is not welcoming all by itself as Iraq

found out in the mid-eighties. No matter how this turns out overall, it will be messy and will likely be a “forever war” that Trump said he would not get involved with in his last run for the presidency. This is not over and will likely be a long running sore.

Russia- Ukraine Conflict

The war continues after more than 1700 days without either side giving way. Russia continues to make small gains but in the past week have actually lost ground to Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukraine has used limited but highly coordinated groupings of forces to achieve their aims including larger all-arms mechanized forces coupled with large drone attacks. It has been successful. The choice of targets usually involve Russian forces that have stalled their offensive efforts and are worn out.

Both Ukraine and Russia have been exchanging massive blows using drones and missiles of various types as mentioned in the last notes, Russia is taking advantage of Ukraine’s lack of Patriot missiles to use their preponderance of ballistic missiles which Ukraine is unable to defend against at present. Ukraine has answered with massive drone and cruise missile attacks against Moscow and St Petersburg. Both sides are achieving successes in this area.

Ukraine anticipates having a patriot analog and a Ukrainian ballistic missile available by the end of the year. Russia also is improving all of its tools in this fight. Russia is also apparently doing a silent mobilization through the internet directly aimed at specific individuals. Individuals are contacted and given a date to report to recruiting centres usually accompanied with notes on what failure to meet the timings. This war is getting heated again, but both sides are tired and having trouble.

China

China is not a friend and in many respects an adversary that has been actively interfering in Canadian political, academic, business and domestic life of our fellow citizens of Chinese descent. In our notes we have noted China’s constant and ongoing attacks under the “Three Wars Concept” using methods other than war to create instability but also to gain influence by way of “useful idiots.” The current government has been less than careful as they should be in dealing with the government of the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). Allowing the import of the Chinese built EVs is an excellent example. Anything from China that connects with the internet is a major security hazard. Canada has no established system to check whether there are forms of various “Trojan horses” within the electronic systems. They are a problem.

China is still in increasingly heavy debt. Its usual money-making systems are failing in including the usual big three, property development, exports and consumer spending. The debt both in public but also hidden debt at levels often below the province or independent cities. Often using a form of companies unofficially loaning money to another in what only be considered a gigantic Ponzi scheme. This has not changed nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future. China is a house of cards economically.

China is once again involved with the basics of the “Belt and Road” initiative looking to rebuild Iran’s infrastructure that the US and Israel have bombed and damaged in two separate wars. One hesitates to think what is being extracted from Iran as a result. Iran is broken; and is unlikely to be solvent in the future. The war is not over and further damage is possible. China

was all too happy to have Pakistan deliver older weapons to Iran while replacing these weapons for Pakistan.

There are a number of articles in the Asian press that remind us that 2027 is the likely date for some sort of Chinese action on Taiwan. There have been many thoughts and opinions on whether China would invade Taiwan. It is likely not a good idea.

Taiwan or as it is also known the Republic of China has been a free and democratic country. It has developed a sound, people led government despite mainland China's ongoing alternating "gifts and threats." Taiwan is a well-developed democracy worthy of support from all the world's democracies, and the world should note the very real difference between the two systems of Government, one a liberal democracy and one an authoritarian imperial power. The question of which one should be supported should be a no brainer, but the world fears the revived imperial China.

Now the question of whether China is likely to invade Taiwan in 2027? The answer is no. The CCP have purged the armed forces including all those who have combat experience and they continue to do so at this time. China does not have the necessary fleet or air force to take the island. The sea route is over 100 miles of water that could be saturated with missile fire from sea, land and air. The geography of the island is difficult with only a few places available for a large landing. The Army would have to produce 250 soldiers to do the initial invasion and have substantial reinforcements just to create a beachhead. Taiwan is estimated to have an actual invasion that would change the scenario completely and almost guarantee a CCP defeat or at least a difficult stalemate.

What is China's best bet? The continuation of reaching out to Taiwan, creating conditions for trade and business, continued connection and conversation with all Taiwanese parties about the way ahead including a Federal system or perhaps status quo. An attack would be a disaster

2. Assessment of Emerging Health-Security, Conflict, Counterterrorism, Diplomatic, Maritime, Military, and Strategic Influence Developments Across Africa During Mid-August 2026, Central Africa And Africa-Wide Strategic Influence Assessment

References

A. Open-source reporting collected through 19 August 2026 from the United Nations, Associated Press, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Institute for Security Studies, Africa Defense Forum, Africanews, Canadian defence reporting, regional media, and associated international sources.

B. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) assessment.

Purpose

A. The purpose of this memorandum is to assess major security, humanitarian, diplomatic, military, counterterrorism, maritime, and strategic-influence developments observed across Africa during mid-August 2026.

B. The assessment examines the accelerating Ebola emergency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, changing battlefield dynamics in Sudan, Russia's expanding military infrastructure in Libya, renewed French-Chadian security contacts, Cameroonian efforts to constrain shadow-fleet activity, Mozambique's counterterrorism coordination reforms, militia dependence in Central Africa, United States migration arrangements with Liberia, and Canada's planned reduction of selected African peace-support deployments.

Executive Assessment

A. Reporting through 19 August indicates that Africa's strategic environment is increasingly characterized by simultaneous state fragility, military competition, public-health emergencies, irregular armed actors, foreign security partnerships, and non-traditional influence mechanisms.

B. Six principal developments are evident:

(1) The Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has exceeded 5,000 reported cases and 2,378 deaths, with transmission continuing faster than containment efforts in several affected areas.

(2) Sudan's conflict is expanding geographically. RSF and allied forces have opened pressure in Blue Nile State around Geisan, while reported defections of hundreds of RSF personnel suggest localized stress within the paramilitary organization without yet demonstrating strategic collapse.

(3) Russia is strengthening infrastructure at multiple Libyan air bases, reinforcing Libya's role as a logistical and military bridge connecting North Africa, the Sahel, Sudan, and the wider Russian security architecture on the continent.

(4) African governments are increasingly confronting governance vulnerabilities that external actors exploit, including maritime registry abuse in Cameroon, militia dependence in Central Africa, and weak coordination between civilian and military counterterrorism institutions.

(5) France and Chad appear to be cautiously rebuilding military cooperation less than two years after N'Djamena terminated its long-standing defence agreement with Paris, illustrating that African strategic realignment does not necessarily produce permanent exclusion of former partners.

(6) Canada is reducing selected military commitments in Africa as part of a broader force-posture rebalancing, creating a modest but symbolically important reduction in Canadian participation in UN-linked missions in the DRC and South Sudan.

C. The dominant strategic pattern is no longer straightforward competition between Western, Russian, and Chinese influence. African governments are increasingly recalibrating partnerships issue by issue, while domestic institutional weakness remains the principal opening through which external influence gains durability.

Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola Emergency

A. Updated Congolese government data reported on 19 August indicate that the Ebola outbreak has surpassed 5,000 cases and caused 2,378 deaths. The outbreak remains concentrated primarily in eastern DRC, where insecurity, population movement, damaged health infrastructure, misinformation, and difficulties reaching affected communities are complicating containment.

B. The regional dimension is increasingly significant. South Sudan has strengthened surveillance along its porous border with the DRC, where hundreds of travellers may pass through official crossings daily and additional movement occurs through informal routes. No confirmed Ebola cases had been reported in South Sudan as of 18 August, but authorities have increased preparedness.

C. Response operations remain vulnerable to community mistrust and attacks upon health personnel. Previous incidents in Bunia, including violence against burial teams, illustrate that misinformation can directly degrade epidemiological control by obstructing safe burial, surveillance, treatment, and contact-tracing operations.

D. Assessment. The outbreak has developed beyond a localized health emergency and now represents a regional security and governance challenge. The greatest danger is the combination of sustained transmission, cross-border mobility, weak public trust, and insecurity affecting health operations. Regional coordination, rather than national containment alone, is increasingly necessary.

Confidence Assessment: High.

Sudan Conflict Expansion and RSF Pressure

A. Fighting in Sudan has expanded beyond the principal Darfur-Kordofan axis. On 11 August, RSF forces supported by elements associated with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North reportedly seized substantial portions of Geisan in Blue Nile State near the Ethiopian border. Sudanese government forces retained their principal military base, while counterattacks and drone strikes forced RSF elements from some positions. Approximately 2,500 people were reported displaced by the renewed fighting.

B. Geisan is strategically relevant because its location near Ethiopia creates additional implications for cross-border movement, arms flows, displacement, and the geographic expansion of the conflict into an area previously less central to the war.

C. On 19 August, Sudanese authorities reported that 318 RSF personnel, including four commanders, had defected to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Additional political and field figures were also reported to have separated from the RSF in recent weeks. These reports suggest pressure within portions of the organization but remain insufficient to demonstrate systemic disintegration.

D. Assessment. The conflict is becoming simultaneously more geographically dispersed and organizationally unstable. RSF advances into Blue Nile demonstrate continued offensive

reach, while defections indicate potential strain in command cohesion. Neither development alone decisively alters the strategic balance. The greater risk is continued fragmentation of Sudan into multiple conflict zones connected by shifting military and tribal alliances.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High.

Libya and Russia's Expanding Military Infrastructure

A. Recent geospatial and defence reporting indicates that Russia is financing, constructing, or supporting infrastructure at six Libyan air bases: Al-Jufra, Al-Khadim, Al-Qardabiyah, Brak al-Shati, Maaten al-Sarra, and Tamanhint. The facilities reportedly support aircraft, drones, air-defence equipment, military personnel, and logistical movements.

B. Maaten al-Sarra is particularly significant because of its proximity to Chad and Sudan. The base provides potential logistical access toward the Sahel and Sudan and strengthens Russia's ability to move personnel or materiel through an inland African network. Russia's increasing reliance upon Libya also reflects the loss of Syria as its former principal regional transit hub following the collapse of the Assad government in late 2024.

C. Russia's footprint complicates Libya's already fragile political settlement. At the same time, United Nations reporting continues to describe institutional division, economic strain, electricity disruption, armed-group competition, and a prolonged political process. The United States has expressed support for defence-sector unification, including proposals for joint operational and training structures, while Russia has cautioned against competing external political initiatives.

D. Assessment. Libya is becoming more strategically important as a Russian logistics node linking the Mediterranean, Sudan, and the Sahel. The military infrastructure itself is more consequential than the number of personnel deployed because it provides Moscow with persistence, mobility, and regional access. This reinforces Libya's role as a geopolitical platform rather than merely a domestic conflict theatre.

Confidence Assessment: High regarding infrastructure development; Moderate to High regarding its future operational utilization.

Cameroon Maritime Registry and Shadow-Fleet Activity

A. Cameroon is attempting to deregister and sanction foreign vessels that fraudulently use its flag to evade scrutiny. The government has suspended some new registrations for ships operating outside Cameroonian waters, initiated an audit of the national registry, and begun strengthening digital registration controls.

B. Reporting identifies Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan-linked oil tankers among vessels exploiting Cameroonian registration. Investigators have also documented forged certificates, fraudulent websites, compromised digital identities, and brokers operating through third countries. Cameroon recorded rapid registry growth during the preceding year, increasing the difficulty of verifying beneficial ownership and sanctions exposure.

C. Assessment. The issue extends beyond sanctions evasion. Weak flag-state governance can facilitate oil smuggling, illicit fishing, narcotics trafficking, deceptive ownership structures, and maritime safety risks. Cameroon's reforms are directionally significant but will require sustained technical verification, beneficial-owner screening, and international maritime information sharing.

Confidence Assessment: High.

Central African Republic and Militia Dependence

A. Security forces across parts of Central Africa continue relying upon local militias to compensate for limited state reach. Such arrangements may provide immediate manpower and local intelligence but blur command responsibility and increase the risk of unauthorized violence, retaliation, looting, and human-rights abuses. Africa Defense Forum highlighted renewed concern on 18 August regarding relationships between national militaries and irregular armed formations in the Central African Republic, DRC, and South Sudan.

B. In the Central African Republic, relations between some community militias, national forces, and Russian-linked personnel have reportedly deteriorated in specific areas, illustrating the fragility of tactical alliances built primarily around short-term security requirements.

C. Separate August reporting alleges that Russian-linked Wagner personnel remain involved in illicit economic networks in the CAR, including gold extraction and tramadol trafficking. These allegations are consistent with broader reporting describing the use of conflict economies to finance armed networks, but individual revenue estimates should be treated cautiously unless independently corroborated.

D. Assessment. Militia integration may temporarily extend government reach but creates long-term accountability and demobilization problems. The combination of weak state institutions, armed local groups, foreign security personnel, and illicit resource economies remains one of the CAR's principal structural vulnerabilities.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High.

Mozambique Counterterrorism Coordination

A. Mozambique established the National Centre for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in November 2025 as part of a wider strategy approved earlier that year. The centre is intended to coordinate intelligence, risk analysis, counter-radicalization, terrorist-financing investigations, and inter-agency responses.

B. The Institute for Security Studies assesses that Mozambique's insurgency has produced more than 6,700 deaths across nearly 2,500 attacks since the conflict began and that longstanding rivalry between security institutions has weakened earlier counterterrorism efforts.

C. Significant limitations remain. The centre is based in Maputo, more than 2,000 kilometres from the principal insurgency environment in Cabo Delgado, has constrained funding and

technology, remains heavily military-led, and lacks sufficiently developed mechanisms for sustained civil-society and local-community participation.

D. Assessment. The centre addresses a genuine coordination deficit but is unlikely to succeed through security operations alone. The durability of the insurgency continues to depend partly upon unemployment, exclusion, corruption, local grievances, and unequal access to natural-resource benefits. Operational coordination must therefore be paired with governance and socioeconomic measures.

Confidence Assessment: High.

China and Emerging Counterterrorism Influence

A. The attachment concerning China's counterterrorism ambitions is an August 2025 analytical study rather than a new August 2026 development and should therefore be treated as strategic background. The paper argued that Beijing was increasingly exploring counterterrorism cooperation as an additional instrument of African influence alongside economic, infrastructure, and military relationships.

B. Current developments support the broader logic that security partnerships are becoming more competitive. Chinese defence equipment, training relationships, infrastructure investment, and economic influence provide Beijing with pathways through which deeper security cooperation could develop, particularly where Western or Russian engagement is reduced.

C. Assessment. There is insufficient evidence in the current reporting set to conclude that China has displaced Russia or Western governments as Africa's principal counterterrorism partner. The more defensible assessment is that Beijing is building optionality. Counterterrorism cooperation could become another layer of influence if African governments request capabilities that China can provide alongside financing, infrastructure, surveillance systems, and defence equipment.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate.

Chad-France Security Re-engagement

A. Reporting on 19 August indicates that Chad and France are cautiously rebuilding military ties less than two years after N'Djamena terminated its long-standing defence cooperation agreement with Paris. Chad originally justified the rupture as necessary to reinforce sovereignty and diversify strategic partnerships.

B. Chad nevertheless continues confronting Boko Haram-linked insecurity around Lake Chad, rebel threats elsewhere in the country, and the challenge of finding partners capable of providing intelligence, logistics, training, and specialized support.

C. For France, restored cooperation with Chad would provide renewed access to an important strategic location linking the Sahel, Libya, Sudan, and Central Africa. Any renewed relationship, however, will almost certainly differ from the previous permanent basing model.

D. Assessment. The apparent rapprochement illustrates that African strategic autonomy should not be interpreted as permanent alignment with any external bloc. N'Djamena appears to be maximizing flexibility rather than replacing one dependency with another. Paris, meanwhile, is adapting toward smaller and more politically sustainable forms of defence cooperation.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High.

Liberia and United States Third-Country Deportation Agreement

A. Liberia has agreed to receive up to 1,200 people deported from the United States over a one-year period. The first group was expected to consist of approximately 20 people, while eligible transferees may include nationals of African and Western Hemisphere countries.

B. The arrangement forms part of a broader United States strategy of reaching agreements with third countries willing to receive deportees who are not necessarily their nationals. Liberia has indicated that participants may seek asylum after arrival or subsequently depart the country.

C. Assessment. The arrangement introduces a new dimension into United States-African relations by linking migration enforcement with bilateral cooperation. For Liberia, potential financial and institutional support must be weighed against domestic political concerns, legal responsibilities, administrative capacity, and reputational risk.

Confidence Assessment: High regarding the agreement; Moderate regarding its long-term political effects.

Canada's Reduced African Military Footprint

A. Canada intends to conclude Operation SOPRANO in South Sudan and Operation CROCODILE in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by mid-2027 while reducing its contribution to Operation CALUMET in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Approximately 50 to 60 Canadian Armed Forces personnel across several international missions are expected to be reassigned under the wider restructuring.

B. Canadian personnel in South Sudan and the DRC currently provide military planning, liaison, operational, and training expertise within UN-related missions. The deployments are small numerically but carry institutional and diplomatic value disproportionate to their size.

C. Assessment. The reduction does not represent a Canadian strategic withdrawal from Africa, but it does reduce Canada's direct military participation in two fragile conflict theatres at a time of increasing Russian, Chinese, Turkish, Gulf, and regional security engagement. Ottawa's future influence will therefore depend increasingly upon diplomacy, training, public-health support, critical-mineral partnerships, development assistance, and targeted security cooperation.

Confidence Assessment: High.

Implications for Canada and Western Partners

A. Canadian and allied intelligence priorities should include the geographic expansion of Sudan's war, Ebola transmission corridors, Russian military infrastructure in Libya, maritime sanctions evasion through African registries, militia-state relationships, and the institutional capacity of African counterterrorism structures.

B. Russia's Libyan network should be assessed as a regional logistics architecture rather than simply a collection of isolated bases. The potential linkage of Libya with Sudan, Chad, the Sahel, and Central Africa provides Moscow with strategic depth and operational flexibility.

C. Western governments should avoid interpreting renewed African engagement with France, China, Russia, or the United States as exclusive alignment. Chad's renewed contact with Paris illustrates that governments increasingly pursue overlapping partnerships based upon specific national requirements.

D. Canada's reduction of military personnel increases the importance of maintaining analytical awareness and civilian engagement. Public health, governance, peace-support training, maritime security, critical minerals, information resilience, and institutional capacity-building remain areas where Canada can retain meaningful influence despite a smaller deployed footprint.

Confidence Assessment

A. High confidence is assessed regarding the DRC Ebola figures reported on 19 August, Cameroon's registry reforms, Mozambique's counterterrorism-centre structure, the Liberia deportation agreement, and Canada's planned mission reductions.

B. Moderate to High confidence is assessed regarding the scale and strategic significance of Russia's Libyan military infrastructure, the French-Chadian rapprochement, and the battlefield significance of developments in Geisan.

C. Moderate confidence is assessed regarding the strategic significance of RSF defections and allegations concerning some Russian-linked illicit commercial activity in the Central African Republic. These developments are credible enough to warrant monitoring but should not be treated as evidence of systemic RSF collapse or as fully independently established financial networks.

Conclusion

A. Africa's strategic environment as of 19 August 2026 is defined by the convergence of conflict expansion, health insecurity, irregular armed structures, foreign military positioning, maritime governance weaknesses, migration diplomacy, and shifting external partnerships.

B. The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has become an increasingly serious regional health-security challenge, with more than 5,000 reported cases and cross-border preparedness becoming progressively more important.

C. Sudan remains the most consequential active conflict in the current reporting period. RSF operations in Blue Nile demonstrate continuing geographic reach, while defections indicate internal pressure but do not yet establish a decisive change in the balance of power.

D. Russia's infrastructure development in Libya represents one of the most strategically significant external-power developments. A persistent network of air bases linking the Mediterranean to the Sahel and Sudan would provide Moscow with logistical flexibility extending far beyond Libya itself.

E. Cameroon and Mozambique illustrate a parallel institutional challenge: African governments increasingly recognize vulnerabilities involving maritime governance and counterterrorism coordination, but implementation capacity remains the decisive variable.

F. Chad's cautious re-engagement with France demonstrates that African strategic autonomy is producing more fluid partnership structures rather than fixed geopolitical blocs. Liberia's deportation agreement with Washington similarly illustrates how migration, economic support, diplomacy, and strategic relationships are becoming interconnected.

G. Canada's planned reduction of selected African military deployments will modestly reduce its direct operational presence. Maintaining influence will consequently require greater reliance upon diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, health security, capacity-building, critical-mineral engagement, and sustainable institutional partnerships.

H. The dominant strategic trend is fragmentation combined with diversification: security threats are spreading across borders while African governments are simultaneously widening their choice of external partners. The actors most likely to retain influence will be those capable of providing sustained, practical support without assuming that African governments will align exclusively with any single geopolitical camp.

Overall Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High.

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Each year an Army Cadet graduate of the Basic Parachutist Course is awarded the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion Bursary by The Army Cadet League of Canada. This year is no

exception and the bursary will be awarded again, tomorrow (24 July 2026). The Army Cadet League of Canada is able to present bursaries and scholarships to deserving cadets thanks to the generosity of our donors and partnering organizations. If you wish to help support an Army Cadet's pursuit of a post-secondary education, please donate today. See photos:

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<https://aircadetleague.com/>

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