Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia

Dispatches

13 November 2026

The Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia provides a forum for the study, promotion and debate of defence, security and safety issues.

Dispatches is a periodic collection of news of interest, including posts to social media by the Institute. Links to articles are checked at the time they are put into *Dispatches* but may be unavailable at a later date or in some countries other than Canada.

Everyone is encouraged to submit links and other content to be included in *Dispatches*. Submissions and feedback are welcome anytime. Email to RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. Comments to articles can be from members or non-members of RUSI(NS). Any comment in *Dispatches* is the sole opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia, the Department of National Defence or other government department, the Canadian Armed Forces, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or other agency.

If you wish to receive *Dispatches* at a different address (i.e., not your work address), please inform RUSI(NS). Past editions of *Dispatches* may be requested by contacting RUSI(NS).

The next issue will be on 27 November 2026.

Quick links:

Events
Publications
@RUSI_NS on X
Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia on Facebook
Other Sources
Odds and Sods
SAC Notes

Remembrance Day 2026

Members of RUSI(NS) gather in Royal Artillery Park for the Remembrance Day ceremony. Our President, VAdm (ret'd) 'Dusty' Miller, and Vice-President, Maj (ret'd) John McLearn, laid a wreath at the cenotaph on behalf of RUSI(NS).






Veterans' Week 2026



On behalf of the Veterans Review and Appeal Board, I would like to take this opportunity, during Veterans' Week, to recognize and thank your organization for the support you provide to Veterans and their families.

Veterans' Week offers Canadians a chance to reflect on the sacrifices, dedication, and extraordinary service of those who have worn our nation's uniform. It is also a time to acknowledge the lasting impact of their contributions and the importance of ensuring they continue to receive the support and respect they deserve

At the Board, we remain committed to serving Veterans, Canadian Armed Forces and RCMP members, and their families with fairness, respect, and compassion.

We are grateful for the partnership and dedication of organizations such as yours that help make a meaningful difference in the lives of those who have served.

Lest we forget.
Richard Thibault


JOUR DU SOUVENIR
NOUS NOUS SOUVIENDRONS D'EUX
GUERRE D'AFRIQUE DU SUD • PREMIÈRE GUERRE MONDIALE • DEUXIÈME GUERRE MONDIALE • CORÉE • GOLFE PERSIQUE • BOSNIE • AFGHANISTAN
MARINE ROYALE CANADIENNE (MRC)
ARMÉE CANADIENNE
AVIATION ROYALE CANADIENNE (ARC)
MARINE MARCHANDE • INFIRMIÈRES
MÉDECINS • AUMÔNIERS • CIVILS
ALLIÉS • BÉNÉVOLES
NOUS NOUS SOUVENONS ÉGALEMENT
DE CEUX QUI PORTENT DES BLESSURES INVISIBLES
TSPT • SANTÉ MENTALE • ET DE CEUX QUE NOUS AVONS PERDUS PAR SUICIDE
SERVICE ET SACRIFICE À TRAVERS LES GÉNÉRATIONS
GUERRE D'AFRIQUE DU SUD • PREMIÈRE GUERRE MONDIALE • DEUXIÈME GUERRE MONDIALE
CORÉE • GOLFE PERSIQUE • AFGHANISTAN • BOSNIE ET LES BALKANS
MISSIONS DE PAIX ET HUMANITAIRES :
SUEZ • CONGO • CHYPRE • HAUTEURS DU GOLAN • SOMALIE • RWANDA • NAMIBIE • ANGOLA • MOZAMBIQUE
MALI • ÉTHIOPIE ET ÉRYTHRÉE • CAMBODGE • TIMOR-ORIENTAL • HAÏTI • KOSOVO • LIBYE • IRAK ET SYRIE • ET BIEN D'AUTRES
Au fil des générations, leur courage a assuré notre liberté ; par leurs sacrifices et leur camaraderie, leur héritage demeure vivant dans le cœur de tous ceux qui se souviennent.
Nous honorons les disparus, les blessures invisibles et les familles endeuillées ; aucun sacrifice n'est oublié, aucune larme d'enfant n'est ignorée, aucun camarade n'est abandonné.
N'OUBLIONS JAMAIS • AUCUN NE SERA JAMAIS OUBLIÉ



They were posted to both Facebook and X

RUSI(NS) on LinkedIn

RUSI(NS) is available on LinkedIn at: https://www.linkedin.com/groups/19653001. It is a public group, so anyone, RUSI(NS) members and non-members, can join. Everyone is encouraged to submit content to be posted to the group. Email content to: Cdr (ret'd) Ian Wood, Group Page Administrator, ian@idhwood.ca

Writing for RUSI(NS)

The content of *Dispatches* and other RUSI(NS) channels is representative of the submissions by RUSI(NS) members. If you want more published about certain fields and topics, you are encouraged to submit material to RUSIDispatches@gmail.com and RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. The public face of RUSI(NS) is what we, the membership, makes it.



Contributions to RUSI(NS) social media

You are encouraged to send material to be posted to the RUSI(NS) X, Facebook and LinkedIn accounts. For X and Facebook, email to rusinsdispatches@gmail.com. For LinkedIn, email to Cdr (ret'd) Ian Wood, Group Page Administrator, at ian@idhwood.ca. Preferably, send the material ready to post. We are looking for a volunteer(s) to be editor(s) for the X and Facebook accounts in order to keep them active.

RUSI(NS) Website

Good progress is being made on bringing our website back up after it was hacked. Whilst there is still no ETR ATT, it is hoped to have it available soon for posting presentations, commentaries, etc.

Events

To list an event in *Dispatches*, email RUSI(NS) by noon Thursday. RUSI(NS) events are by invitation. If you are interested in attending and have not been invited, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com. RUSI(NS) events may be cancelled at short notice. Email RUSI(NS) if there is a question of an event occurring.

RUSI(NS) Events: November-December 2026

November - **24 November, Tuesday,** Capt (N) Tom Tulloch's Presentation: "The History of the Halifax Shipyard", RA Park, 1300-1500 hrs, (Atlantic Time);
- **25 November, Wednesday,** tour ISI, TBC.

December - **3 December, Thursday,** Presentation on RCAF Modernization, 1300 hrs, (Atlantic Time), Mighty Maroon Room, has been **postponed till 17 February 2027**;
9 December, Wednesday, Presentation on RCN strategy, details TBA;
- **10 December, Thursday,** Winter/Holiday Meet and Greet, RA Park, 1400-1600 hrs (Atlantic Time).

Proposed Presentations and Events for 2027:

a. CCG Aircraft Service Delivery, tentative January 27
b. Industry Canada Update discussion group or presentation, February 2027
c. CBSA Intelligence Centre Mar 27
d. Irving Shipbuilding Industries, 2nd tour, April 27
e. The Future of Maritime Air, May 27
f. Naval Modernization/Corvette Program, June 27
g. Canadian Tactical Helo program, September 27
h. Army of the Future/Equipment Update, October 27
i. Naval Mine Warfare/Advanced Naval Capabilities, TBC
j. Canada's International Defence Commitments, TBC
k. Canada's Commercial Fleet/Modernization/rebuild? TBC
l. Sanctions Development and Implementation discussion group
m. Arctic Security Discussion Group
n. OSINT Discussion Group
o European Joint Task Force - Should Canada Join? discussion group
p. Army Reorg Update, Inflection Point 2025
r. Canada's Drone Program Update.

It should be noted that these are all proposals and are subject to change. New ideas and concepts are welcome to next year's program. The dates shown are aspirational.

New: **24 November, Tuesday -** RUSI(NS) member Capt(N) Tom Tulloch RCN (ret'd) will present "The History of the Halifax Shipyard", covering from inception of the shipyard to the mid-20th century. The presentation will take in the construction of the facility, its pre-Great War existence, the 1917 explosion and aftermath, and its function as both a ship repair facility and a ship building facility since the explosion. The event will be hybrid, online (Teams) and in person at Royal Artillery Park Officers' Mess, 1300-1500 Atlantic time.
To register, email RUSINovaScotia@gmail.com by close-of-business Sun, 22 November.

Wargaming Events: Georgetown University Wargaming Society long-range schedule: https://www.guwargaming.org/guwsevents

Publications

The following publications are received by RUSI(S) from other associations. The latest edition, where not otherwise indicated, may be requested by emailing RUSI(NS). To readers of *Dispatches* from other associations, sharing of your publications is appreciated.

weekly:
RUSI-A *Newsletter*: https://rusi.au/Newsletters.php
Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Defence Update*
Vancouver Artillery Association and Royal United Services Institute Vancouver *Members News*

bi-weekly:
Canadian Marine Industries and Shipbuilding Association *On Watch*
https://www.cmisa.ca/cpages/on-watch-current

monthly:
Canadian Gunner News
Edmonton United Services Institute President's *Enews*
Military Institute of Windsor *Communiqué*
Royal Alberta United Services Institute *Dispatches*
Royal Canadian Logistics Service *The Logistician*
Royal Canadian Naval Association Admiral Hose Branch *Scuttlebutt*
Royal United Services Institute of Vancouver Island *Newsletter*
Veterans Affairs Canada *Salute*!
RUSI-NSW *Newsletter* (**new:** October): https://rusinsw.au/site/Newsletters.php

quarterly:
Naval Reserve Association of Canada *Connexions* (latest: September): https://navalreserveassociationofcanada.ca/connexions/
Royal United Services Institute of Victoria (Australia) *Quarterly Newsletter*
RUSI-A *United Service* journal: https://rusi.au/Publications.php#Journal

other:
RUSI-A monographs: https://rusi.au/Monographs.php
RUSI-A lectures: https://rusi.au/Videos/Videos.php
RUSI-A podcasts: https://rusi.au/SIG_S/Strategy.php
There are links on the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Australia (RUSI-A) home page (https://www.rusi.org.au/) to the seven branches across Australia.

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Australia

There are links on the RUSI-A home page (https://www.rusi.org.au/) to the seven branches across Australia, including New South Wales whose newsletter is also listed below:
RUSI-A United Service (quarterly): https://rusi.au/Publications.php#Journal
RUSI-A Newsletter (weekly): https://rusi.au/Newsletters.php
RUSI-NSW Newsletter (weekly): https://rusinsw.au/site/Newsletters.php
RUSI-A monographs: https://rusi.au/Monographs.php
RUSI-A lectures: https://rusi.au/Videos/Videos.php
RUSI-A podcasts: https://rusi.au/SIG_S/Strategy.php

@RUSI_NS on X

To have something posted or reposted, email RUSI(NS).

National Post @nationalpost 7 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
'No decision has been made' to replace military's troubled Cyclone helicopter fleet (https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/no-decision-has-been-made-to-replace-militarys-troubled-cyclone-helicopter-fleet/)



Craig Hoyle @FlightAcesHigh 6 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
Canada facing 'knife-edge timeline' to replace Hornets as @LockheedMartin F-35 purchase remains in limbo. Story cites official speaking under Chatham House reporting rules at @DefenceIQ International Fighter Conference.
https://flightglobal.com/defence/2026/11/canada-facing-knife-edge-timeline-to-replace-hornets-as-f-35-purchase-remains-in-limbo/



"It's been erroneously reported in many news services as 16. It's 12: four aircraft in [production] Lot 18, four in Lot 19 and four in Lot 20," they said, speaking under the event's Chatham House reporting rules. "And then we've got commitments on long-lead items on a subsequent 18."

"Impact of Shipbuilding at the #Halifax Shipyard"
https://www.signal49.ca/product/impact-of-shipbuilding-at-the-halifax-shipyard_oct2026/
"highlights activities, programs & economic benefits associated with National Shipbuilding Strategy #NSS at @IrvingShipbuild 2013-28" H/T @S49Research



Murray Brewster @Murray_Brewster 4 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
Canada looking to Germany for eight submarines upfront - four later: sources #cdnpoli #NATO #Germany #submarines
(https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-germany-submarines-defence-industry-economy-9.7407952)



Comments from a leading Defence Blogger:
https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/brewster-canada-looking-to-germany

NAADSN_RDSNAA @NAADSN_RDSNAA 3 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
Happy Tuesday! @WhitneyLackenb1 recently published a #QuickImpact on the centrality of community resilience and defense planning in his latest NAADSN piece.
https://naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/26oct21-Climate-Change-Coastal-Erosion-Arctic-Security-Quick-Impact-PWL.pdf
(Climate Change, Coastal Erosion, and Arctic Security: Why Community Resilience and Defence Planning Must Go Hand in Hand)



Hybrid CoE @HybridCoE 3 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
A new Hybrid CoE paper addresses legal uncertainty around maritime hybrid threats, coordinated attacks against critical underwater infrastructure, and escalation designed to avoid triggering Article 5. #hybridthreats #maritimesecurity #internationallaw
(Hybrid CoE Paper examines legal responses for countering maritime hybrid threats



https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/hybrid-coe-paper-examines-legal-responses-for-countering-maritime-hybrid-threats/)

2 Nov 26 @Transport_gc celebrated 90th anniversary of department's creation https://www.canada.ca/en/transport-canada/news/2026/11/statement-from-minister-mackinnon-marking-transport-canadas-90th-anniversary.html "more than a regulatory body … a powerful economic engine that helps keep Canada 🇨🇦 moving in an ever-changing world" @RUSI_NS honoured to support



Emergency Management Group Inc. @EmergMgt 31 Oct posted:
De Havilland Canada Announces Canadair 515 Production Increase
https://dehavilland.com/production/de-havilland-canada-announces-agreement-and-de-havilland-canadair-515-production-increase/
Production will double, reducing delivery time and making more waterbombers available for worldwide demand.



RUSI(NS) quoted:
CAN 🇨🇦 should establish a national waterbomber capability of federal, provincial, territorial & commercial aircraft that can deploy to reinforce local firefighting efforts. Support with basing, training/maintenance facilities, logistics of federal departments #FlexibilityOfAirpower

Noah Gairn's Note:
https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/de-havilland-canada-announces-agreement


"Harry DeWolf-Class Reaches Full Operational Capability"
https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/harry-dewolf-class-reaches-full-operational FOC= full attainment of people, training, infrastructure, equipment, spares & sustainment needed to support @RoyalCanNavy #Arctic & Offshore Patrol Vessels H/T @NoahGairn



Comment:

Official definition of Full Operational Capability (FOC): "the full attainment of the ability to effectively employ a new or improved capability, and for which fully achieved infrastructure, training, staffing, and support are in place, both for the new capability and for the organization employing it."

Murray Brewster @Murray_Brewster 29 Oct posted:
Ottawa's sluggish bureaucracy leaves critical gaps in Canadian military ammo supply: AG #cdnpoli #Defence #audit #NATO (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-ammunition-auditor-procurement-9.7401723)



RUSI(NS) quoted:
"Ammunition for the Canadian Armed Forces" https://www.canada.ca/en/auditor-general/our-work/audit-reports/24-auditor-general-202610-ammunition-canadian-armed-forces.html
"@NationalDefence did not manage its ammunition to meet its regular-use and strategic stockpile needs."

Irving Shipbuilding @IrvingShipbuild 29 Pct posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
Fair winds and following seas to our team and additional crew members who have embarked on Sea Trials onboard the future CCGS Donjek. This milestone is part of ongoing verification work before delivery of the first AOPS built for the Canadian Coast Guard later this fall.



Comment:
Note that whilst ongoing sea trails and still an Irving vessel, Donjek does not carry Canadian Coast Guard markings. Though it does have the maple leaf indicating it is a Canadian government vessel.

NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 30 Oct posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:

Canada is strengthening its physical defences, but the narrative surrounding these efforts is being contested. JRF Rylie Taylor Tsui explores how Russian disinformation could undermine public confidence in Canada's Arctic defence initiatives and cooperation with NATO allies.
(Challenging the North: Disinformation and the Battle over Canada's Arctic Sovereignty



https://natoassociation.ca/challenging-the-north-disinformation-and-the-battle-over-canadas-arctic-sovereignty/)

Comment:
"The battle for the North depends not only on physical military strength, but also on Canada's ability to protect its northern sovereignty against threats posed by foreign disinformation."

"Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia" on Facebook
To have something posted or commented, email RUSI(NS).

European naval chiefs meet to discuss North Atlantic defence without the Royal Navy
https://www.navylookout.com/european-naval-chiefs-meet-to-discuss-north-atlantic-defence-without-the-royal-navy/



"...navies cannot base their planning on ships that exist only in future programmes."

"...leadership also depends on being able to provide assets consistently."

This article is a mix of force development and consequent strategy (naval, maritime, and grand/alliance). Of note: where is Canada in all this?

Navantia UK considers the significant design challenges of Large Uncrewed Surface Vessels
https://www.navylookout.com/navantia-uk-considers-the-significant-design-challenges-of-large-uncrewed-surface-vessels/



A well written analysis, with defence production aspects.

"Modularity is often portrayed as stacking containers on a deck, but the interfaces are far more involved." A few years ago, a CCG ship project officer requested and obtained a copy of the NATO standard for container interfaces. Such interface standards could well do with an examination to ensure they support interoperability between the RCN, CCG and other government and non-government vessels when operating drones, especially given the new relationship between the RCN and CCG.

"Navantia's designers regard 75 metres as roughly the minimum for sustained blue-water operations in the worst conditions..." Displacement used to be a metric for sustained heavy seas operations of crewed vessels (2,300 tons used to be a figure prior to modern design features such as fin stabilizers). A length of 75 metres may be a useful rough rule-of-thumb

for uncrewed surface vessels.

"Type 9X vessels are a different category altogether, complex warships expected to spend weeks on station in high seas, potentially carrying sensors and missiles worth far more than the hull, over a service life measured in years." It could be useful to categorize uncrewed boats from ships, part of the discussion as to when is a drone a vessel and when is it an equipment/munition. Certainly it would be useful to appreciate the differences. One of the considerations should be the intended ship/boat life - RCN warships are designed for 30 years, drones will likely have lives much shorter if only because of the rapidity of development of related technologies.

Reclaiming the Waves: A Maritime-First Defence Strategy for Britain's National Interests
https://www.prosperity.com/media-publications/reclaiming-the-waves/



"To reverse this absent strategic clarity, this paper proposes a reenvisioned maritime-first defence strategy in order to serve the British national interest, through 2035."

"...this paper proposes as a modernised adaptation of the maritime strategy of Sir Julian Corbett outlined in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century."

The 'British way of war' may not apply completely to Canada, but as an occupant of an island continent, Canada should reflect upon that way. There has been at least one Canadian parliamentarian who has commented that the defence of Canada starts with naval and air power. To what extent Canada's maritime strategy engages/should engage offshore and project power is a point of commanders'/staff debate/study

Report at: https://www.prosperity.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Reclaiming-the-waves-23.10.26.pdf

Other Sources

#airpower
Does Coercive Bombing Work?
https://www.hoover.org/research/does-coercive-bombing-work

#artificial intelligence #Russia-Ukraine War #China
AI Lessons From Russia's War in Ukraine
https://jamestown.org/ai-lessons-from-russias-war-in-ukraine/

#artificial intelligence #warfare
Super Intelligence and the Distancing Effect
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/the-distancing-effect/
"While smart algorithms and remote systems offer unmatched velocity, they risk separating operators from the physical reality of the battlefield, detaching leaders from direct accountability, and leaving organizations blind to how machine conclusions are reached."

Cyber Intelligence
What is the impact of cyberattacks? Spoiled food, drained bank accounts, and burst pipes in water systems are three examples. Worse, cyberattacks are increasing in number and continuing to spread across the globe. When Thailand has cyber problems, no corner of the globe is safe.

Thailand Under Daily Cyber Pressure as Global Attacks Escalate
https://thestandardglobal.co/economy/thailand-daily-cyber-attacks-escalate/

Comparitech has observed a rise in ransomware attacks against government organizations

https://www.itpro.com/security/ransomware/no-government-entity-large-or-small-previously-targeted-or-not-is-immune-ransomware-attacks-on-government-agencies-have-surged-91-percent-in-a-year

Even in staid, backwater Canada, evildoers are hitting targets:

(Canada / Ontario) 'Increasingly sophisticated': Data breach affecting Williams Food Equipment puts customers on alert
https://www.ctvnews.ca/windsor/article/increasingly-sophisticated-data-breach-affecting-williams-food-equipment-puts-customers-on-alert/

(Canada / British Columbia) Russian hacker group claims to have posted B.C. school district information on dark web
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/qilin-burnaby-school-ransomware-9.7409539

(Canada / British Columbia) Central Okanagan students, staff targeted in cybersecurity breach
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/central-okanagan-kelowna-school-district-cybersecurity-9.7407906

(Canada) York University warns of personal data theft in cybersecurity incident
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/york-university-department-forms-cybersecurity-incident-9.7414235

(Canada / Ontario) Data breach at The Children's Foundation
https://www.quintenews.com/2026/11/10/childrens-foundation-data-b

#defence budget
Federal budget maps out defence spending surge, but questions remain over NATO target
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-budget-military-nato-trump-9.7411329

Blogger's Comment:
Budgets and Baselines: https://philippelagasse.substack.com/p/budgets-and-baselines

#drones
Phantom Boats and Ghost Ships: A New Framework for Assessing Unmanned Surface Vessels
https://csbaonline.org/resource/phantom-boats-and-ghost-ships-a-new-framework-for-assessing-unmanned-surface-vessels/

#drones
Underwater Drone Threats Are Already Here. America Isn't Ready.
https://centerformaritimestrategy.org/publications/underwater-drone-threats-are-already-here-america-isnt-ready/

#drones
The Command We Must Start
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/the-command-we-must-start
"...three things the plan (for an Autonomous Warfare Command) must settle: the authority to allocate resources among theaters, edge computing, and magnets for drones stocked before the ban. These items remain the test of the plan when it appears."

#drones
Can inertial navigation make ground-robot swarms real?
https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2026/10/inertial-navigation-ground-robot-swarms/416914/
"...the biggest obstacle to deploying swarms of ground robots: the need for GPS-free navigation in a small package."
Likely someone in DRDC is working on GPS-free navigation, whether for UGV or other platforms.

Comment from a Colleague:
There are likely groups within DRDC working on this. DRDC Atlantic is working on aspects of the problem, as UUV must naturally operate in GPS-denied environments. A DRDC Atlantic scientist is collaborating with a NATO group to test and evaluate quantum positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) solutions. A trial was completed at the NATO ACT SHINE* event a couple of weeks back, the event that featured the 'famous' silver blimp.
(* *Ed*: SHINE is the final experimentation and demonstration phase of NATO Allied Command Transformation's annual Innovation Continuum.)

#drones
The Art of Swarming - Launched Effects and the Future of Mass on the Modern Battlefield
https://www.csis.org/analysis/art-swarming
"Mass still matters in war, but modern military formations must generate it through swarms of

distributed, low-cost, hard-to-target systems..." "The (Pentagon and Congress) need to build the doctrine, units, sustainment, and acquisition pathways to field swarm-capable forces at scale and restore the offense on a battlefield where cheap sensors and precision strike increasingly favor the defender."

#drones
Updated Canadian Asset Map and Assessment of Global Competitiveness in the Area of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/6813be17526e3b3f8b2974b2/t/683745d267cff80d346f35ee/1748452827330/Updated+Canadian+MASS+-+v7.0+-+Covers.pdf

#drones
Ribbit demonstrates collaborative teaming between autonomous helicopter, airplane, and drones
https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/ribbit-demonstrates-collaborative
Note Noah's Note. In some respects, converting/remoting old aircraft for new roles harks back to the early days of drones, and the light aircraft *Queen Bee* as an anti-aircraft artillery target (see: "The Mother of All Drones" https://www.vintagewings.ca/stories/mother-of-all-drones). Interesting to see de Havilland's involvement - some of us tend to know them more these days for their water bombers.

#drones
US Navy wants more visible role for drone boats as one deploys for the first time
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2026/10/29/us-navy-wants-more-visible-role-for-drone-boats-as-one-deploys-for-the-first-time/
Establishing units and occupations, training, certification, engineering and logistics support and all the other enabling aspects need to be developed in conjunction with acquiring drones. Can't just buy the kit.

#economic warfare
China Takes Its Lawfare to Sea
https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/10/27/panama-canal-china-maritime-lawfare/

#information operations
War for the Mind: Narrative Intelligence, AI, and the Fight in the Cognitive Domain
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/war-for-the-mind-narrative-intelligence-ai-and-the-fight-in-the-cognitive-domain/
Narrative intelligence "is the systematic practice of detecting, understanding, analyzing, and acting on the stories—true, partial, or false—that shape how people interpret events, form beliefs, and make decisions."

Comment from a Colleague:
The article is a timely analysis, given current global events. For those of us less fleet of foot than in days of yore tasked with carrying out media monitoring/analysis, the multitude of evolving communications platforms/AI and rapidity of dissemination of 'false narratives' is

indeed mind-boggling... and I suspect challenging to say the least for today's PAO. Plus, add in the evolving terminology, e.g., narrative intelligence...whew! All to say, bear down, think harder, react faster.

#intelligence
The Enduring Nature of Intelligence
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/nature-of-intelligence/

#intelligence
The Night of the Long (election) Knives and the U.S. intelligence community
https://wesleywark.substack.com/p/the-night-of-the-long-election-knives
And for the Canadian intelligence community.

#land power
Preparing U.S. Land Forces to Fight in an Era of Strategic and Technological Disruption
https://www.csis.org/analysis/preparing-us-land-forces-fight-era-strategic-and-technological-disruption
"... the utility and relevance of (U.S.) land forces in the contemporary global security environment and discusses the inherent advantages and limits of land forces as part of the joint force."

Further:
"Better technology does not automatically yield better warfighting, the authors argue. Rather, the side that harnesses technology better to meet its objectives usually prevails."

#land warfare
Across the line
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2026/10/across-line/416947/
Fiction is a great way to get people thinking and talking about possibilities.

#land warfare
A Shot to the Brain: How Land Operations is Stifling the Excellence of the Canadian Army's Officer Corps
https://www.canada.ca/en/army/services/canadian-army-journal/articles/2026/22-1-gallant-how-land-operations-stifles-excellence.html

#logistics
Still hoping and planning for the best: military logistics, strategic preparedness and the role of the logistics community
https://logisticsinwar.com/2026/11/03/still-hoping-and-planning-for-the-best-military-logistics-strategic-preparedness-and-the-role-of-the-logistics-community/
A number of links to other logistics articles in this piece.

NATO Association of Canada @NATOCanada 4 Nov posted and RUSI(NS) reposted:
In this article, Inpyo Nam examines Canada's current counter-drone capabilities and argues for risk-based protection requirements for critical infrastructure operators.



(Beyond the Battlefield: Protecting Canada's Critical Energy Infrastructure from Emerging Drone Threats
https://natoassociation.ca/beyond-the-battlefield-protecting-canadas-critical-energy-infrastructure-from-emerging-drone-threats/)

#Royal Canadian Air Force
An Update On Cyclone
https://www.truenorthstrategicreview.ca/p/an-update-on-cyclone

#Royal Canadian Air Force #defence procurement
The Beleaguered Cyclone, the Baby, and the Bathwater
https://www.policyhawk.ca/p/the-beleaguered-cyclone-the-baby

#Russia #wargaming
Russia's Achilles' heel: Kaliningrad crisis exercise tests the limits of Moscow's power
https://www.ism.lt/en/russias-achilles-heel-kaliningrad-crisis-exercise-tests-the-limits-of-moscows-power/

#Russia-Ukraine War #land warfare
The New Subterranean Front
https://www.theatlantic.com/national-security/2026/10/ukraine-war-gas-pipelines-russia/689105/
Shades of underground warfare during the First World War. There are a number of books about that - break 'em out to read.

***Salute!* November 2026 is available in**
https://www.veterans.gc.ca/en/news-and-media/salute/november-2026

#security
Winnipeg's CentrePort aims to build a food, defence and industrial hub with expansion
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/centreport-expansion-plans-9.7403893
"The federal government plans four food terminals and 20 to 40 smaller food hubs across Canada, with the goal of reducing prices by being less reliant on big grocery retailers' supply chains."
Inland ports - interesting idea, particularly if it helps with food security. Such ports need to be integrated into military transportation (and security) staffwork.

#security

Canada and the European Union announce new Alliance for the Future to create greater affordability, opportunity, and sovereignty
https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/news-releases/2026/10/30/canada-and-european-union-announce-new-alliance-future-create-greater.
Note Noah's Notes.

#training
Want Better Training Outcomes? Let the Opposing Force Win
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/want-better-training-outcomes-let-the-opposing-force-win/

#warfare
Reinvention Is a Key Part Of Readiness
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2026/november/reinvention-key-part-readiness
Exaptation - "an existing feature evolves to serve a function different from its original purpose. In organizational and strategic contexts, exaptation describes the repurposing of established capabilities in novel domains. A force that believes itself ready can quickly learn otherwise when what appears dominant is made irrelevant. The <insert your service here> must prioritize 'exaptation readiness' and continually reassess how they define and measure readiness in an era of accelerating disruption."

Ed:
We may see this word more often alongside innovation and adaptation.

Further:
"Victory smiles upon those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur." (Douhet)

#warfare
Churchill, Maneuver, and the Stickiness of Language
https://dispatch.bazaarofwar.com/p/churchill-maneuver-and-the-stickiness

#wargaming
What War Games Actually Teach: Threat Recognition, Not Prediction
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=preprints

#wargaming
Matrix Games: A Valuable and Underappreciated Tool for Cognitive Skills Training
https://www.shadowboxtraining.com/news/2026/09/04/matrix-games-a-valuable-and-underappreciated-tool-for-cognitive-skills-training/
Hadta look up shadowbox exercises: "refer to cognitive, scenario-based decision-making drills designed to build tactical acumen and mental muscle memory."

#wargaming #China #artificial intelligence
The Evolution of Chinese Wargaming
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2026.2749558

Odds and Sods

#animal warfare

The chances of being attacked by a bear carrying a landmine are low, but never zero. H/T kagan.dunlap Instagram

Comment:
Hey, during the Great Patriotic War the Soviets had dogs with anti-tank explosives strapped to their backs.



2025-26 Departmental Results Report

From Politico (political newsfeed)

The Department of National Defence's latest annual results report (https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-report/drr-2025-26.html) spells out the military's stark challenges as it begins a massive spending push — and details how the people paid to defend the country rate their quality of life.

— **NORAD contribution:** The Canadian Armed Forces failed to meet 10.7% of its obligations to the North American Aerospace Defense Command, blaming "maintenance and weather affecting sortie success rates, communications reliability, and staffing levels below requirements."

Also at partial fault, per the report's authors: "internal reporting limitations and classified factors that restrict detailed analysis."

— **Operational targets:** DND measured 75 international operational objectives. The report pegged the success rate at 91% and blamed any misses on "a rapidly changing geopolitical environment" that forced the CAF "to reallocate logistical resources across operations to deliver on critical objectives and effects."

— **Navy blues:** 53.9% of the naval fleet was serviceable in 2025-26, far below the 75% target meant to be achieved by 2036.

"Constrained ship availability caused by major maintenance cycles and personnel shortages were contributing factors to the current result," the report read. Also: "Submarine availability declined due to maintenance and crew requirements."

— **Army grunts:** Only 48% of the land fleet was serviceable in 2025-26. The long-term target is 80% by 2036. The culprits: "Persistent structural pressures were contributing factors to the

current result. More funding of late "has been insufficient to offset the long-term effects of historical underfunding and aging fleets, and a sustained high operational tempo."

— **Air time:** A mere 41.9% of the air force fleet was serviceable in 2025-26, less than half the 2036 target of 85%. "Ongoing personnel shortages, supply chain disruptions, and the increasing maintenance demands of aging platforms were contributing factors to the current result," read the report. "Scheduled major maintenance, unforeseen equipment problems, underfunding and increasingly outdated equipment also affected serviceability."

— **Family feud:** "Overall, 42.3% of Regular Force members and 43.6% of Primary Reserve members reported that the CAF provides a reasonable quality of life for service members and their families," the report read. Happiness factors include "postings, relocations and operational tempo." The target: 85%.

#drone CASEVACs







Ukraine claims world's first drone evacuation of wounded soldier
https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/ukraine-first-drone-evacuation-wounded-soldier-frontlines-hexacopter-rcna604310

Ukraine's StarGate Drone Now Evacuating Wounded Soldiers
https://www.twz.com/air/ukraines-stargate-drone-now-evacuating-wounded-soldiers

"Ukrainian soldier who managed to escape from the Russians that surrounded him after an electric bike was dropped to him by a large aerial drone."

Ukraine flies the first drone rescues of wounded troops
https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/ukraine-flies-the-first-drone-rescues-of-wounded-troops/

"Conventional casualty evacuation has become close to impossible along much of the front because the density of drone coverage turns any vehicle movement into a target, and uncrewed ground vehicles took over much of the work at the cost of speed. Survival after serious trauma depends heavily on reaching surgical care quickly, and a crawling robot moving along a mined route can take many hours to cover ground a helicopter would cross in minutes."

Comment:
Ambulance units may now need to have drone operation sections.

#drones #Russia-Ukraine War

Russian vehicles can now shrug off cheap drones. Near Huliaipole, Ukrainian pilots are sending one they can't https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/11/06/fp-versus-tank/

Up-armored vehicles might survive many small first-person-view drone attacks, but heavy, powerful fixed-wing drones change the cost analysis.



Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, News Release

Operation BOXTOP Marks Successful Resupply Mission to Canadian Forces Station Alert, October 30, 2026 – Ottawa, Ontario – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) has completed Operation BOXTOP, its semi-annual resupply mission delivering critical supplies to Canadian Forces Station (CFS) Alert, Nunavut which ran from October 8 to 30, 2026.

Operation BOXTOP supports the Canadian Armed Forces' (CAF) permanent presence and near-persistent operational approach in the Arctic. The operation commenced when a CC-177 Globemaster III from 429 Transport Squadron, 8 Wing Trenton, deployed to Pituffik Space Base, Greenland, in support of the resupply mission.

Operation BOXTOP successfully delivered all planned dry cargo and anticipated fuel requirements to CFS Alert. The mission demonstrated the CAF's ability to project and sustain air mobility operations in the Arctic's challenging and remote environment while working alongside military and civilian partners from Denmark, Greenland and the United States. The integration of loadmasters from No. 99 Squadron of the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force further strengthened interoperability and enabled the exchange of expertise among allied air forces. By maintaining the station's operations throughout the Arctic winter, Operation BOXTOP reinforces Canada's ability to sustain continuous military presence and operational reach across the Arctic.

Operation BOXTOP began in the 1950s. Using United States Pituffik Space Base in Greenland as a staging point, the RCAF runs day and night, flying fuel and supplies to the station during the operation. Over the last 20 years, the mission has averaged an **annual** delivery of approximately 650,000 pounds of dry goods and 1.5 million litres of fuel into CFS Alert.

Naval Association Canada (NAC) News, 30 October-12 November 2026, Selected Information

Canada:
Canada's 2026 National Security Strategy

CDAI : Why Canada Is Partnering with the U.S. and Finland to Build Icebreakers

Dubai's DP World in Talks on Alliance With Northern Canada Port

Joint statement from Canada and the United Kingdom

Military memorials and monuments - Remembrance Day 2026 (All ages)

The World:
Germany Launches Cleanup to Remove Dumped Munitions From WWI and WWII

Luxury cruise passengers stranded in Cambodia due to soaring fuel costs

Royal Navy service honours Queen Elizabeth II with laying up of colours

Russian Navy conducts Arctic defense exercise using coastal anti-ship missile

Spanish yard launches new corvette for Royal Saudi Naval Forces

Xi Jinping Completes His Military Purge, Including PLA Navy's Top Admirals

Overview of National Defence Investments and Initiatives Budget 2026: *Masters of Our Destiny*

Ed: A message from Dana O'Born, Chief of Staff, Minister of National Defence

Following the release of Budget 2026: *Masters of Our Destiny*, we're pleased to share an overview of the key National Defence investments and initiatives, including measures to strengthen Canada's defence capabilities, support Canadian industry, and advance our sovereignty and security.

Budget 2026 builds on the government's commitment to rebuild, rearm, and reinvest in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), while creating new opportunities for Canadian businesses, strengthening domestic supply chains, and deepening cooperation with our allies.

Below is a summary of the key defence-related measures, along with broader initiatives of interest to stakeholders across the defence and security sectors.

Support for CAF members and families – $28 million

Following the tragic incident at CFB Wainwright, Budget 2026 proposes:

- $25 million over two years for Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services to support affected CAF members, families, and local communities.
- $3 million in 2026-27 for the Wainwright Military Family Resource Centre.

NATO defence spending and commitments

Budget 2026 provides a publicly costed pathway toward meeting Canada's NATO defence spending commitments.

- More than $700 billion in combined core defence and broader defence- and security-related expenditures over five years, beginning in 2026-27.
- Building on Canada's achievement of NATO's 2% of GDP defence spending target, the government is on track to reach 4% this decade and remains committed to 5% by 2035.
- The Budget provides greater transparency on how expenditures are categorized and reported, including investments in military capabilities, infrastructure, national security, and resilience.

Defence Drone Initiative – $2.3 billion

Budget 2026 proposes $2.3 billion over five years, beginning in 2027-28, to accelerate the discovery, acquisition, and deployment of uncrewed and counter-uncrewed capabilities.

- Supports Canadian businesses developing drone technologies, autonomous systems, and counter-drone capabilities.
- Strengthens domestic production capacity and Canadian supply chains.
- Builds on the Defence Drone Initiative launched in July 2026, which provides access to nearly 400 trusted Canadian suppliers.
- Supports collaboration with international partners, including Ukraine.

A portion of this funding will be sourced from amounts already provisioned in the fiscal framework.

Operation REASSURANCE – $7.6 billion

The Budget identifies $7.6 billion over five years, beginning in 2026-27, to extend and expand Operation REASSURANCE, Canada's largest overseas military mission.

- Extends Canada's contribution to NATO's Eastern Flank through 2031.
- Supports a planned increase in persistently deployed Canadian personnel to up to 2,600.
- Reinforces Canada's leadership in Latvia and its contribution to NATO's collective defence.

This funding will be sourced from existing DND resources.

Defence Industrial Strategy – up to $2.7 billion

Budget 2026 directs up to $2.7 billion over five years from previously announced funding toward implementing Canada's Defence Industrial Strategy.

The funding will support several priorities, including:

- **Quantum technologies:** Advancing Phase 2 of the Canadian Quantum Champions Program to help Canadian firms develop and scale quantum computing capabilities.
- **Space:** Expanding Launch the North to support a sovereign Canadian medium-lift space launch capability, domestic propulsion technologies, and launch infrastructure.
- **Defence innovation:** Continuing initiatives including BOREALIS, Defence Industry Assist, export promotion, and the Regional Defence Investment Initiative.
- **Industrial resilience:** Recapitalizing the Canadian Defence Industry Resilience Program to support strategic investments in domestic defence capabilities.
- **Munitions and supply chains:** Supporting completion of a nitrocellulose production facility in Québec and advancing Canadian production of high-grade ballistic steel.
- **Uncrewed systems:** Fully operationalizing National Research Council drone innovation hubs and supporting new competitions for Canadian industry.
- **Research and development:** Supporting Canadian space technologies and specialized secure facilities where industry can work with DND on sovereign capabilities.

These measures will help Canadian companies grow, strengthen domestic production, and increase participation in Canadian and allied defence supply chains.

Defence procurement and capability development

The Budget also highlights progress on several major defence procurement and modernization initiatives.

- **Defence Investment Agency:** Advancing legislation to establish the Agency as a Crown corporation with a permanent mandate focused on defence procurement, production, and investment.
- **Canadian Patrol Submarine Project:** Advancing the procurement of new submarines, with an emphasis on Canadian industrial and supply-chain opportunities.
- **Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar:** Advancing surveillance capabilities to strengthen Arctic security and continental defence.
- **Armoured Combat Support Vehicles:** Nearly $2 billion for 190 additional vehicles, expanding Canada's fleet from 360 to 550.
- **GlobalEye:** Advancing discussions on a potential acquisition of six airborne early warning and control aircraft.
- **Defence Innovation Secure Hubs:** Supporting Canadian research and innovation in quantum technologies, uncrewed systems, and other emerging capabilities.

Canada–EU defence cooperation and Ukraine

Budget 2026 outlines Canada's intention to participate in the European Union's €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan.

- Participation could allow Canadian defence companies to compete for approximately €60 billion in Ukrainian defence procurement opportunities.
- The Budget proposes up to $61.9 million over four years, beginning in 2027-28, and $109.2 million in future years through Global Affairs Canada.
- This would support Ukraine's security while opening new opportunities for Canadian defence manufacturers and exporters.

Defence, Security and Resilience Bank

The Budget reiterates Canada's intention to establish the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, with full operationalization targeted for 2027.

The proposed institution, with a Canadian headquarters and European hub in Luxembourg, is intended to improve access to financing for defence, security, and resilience investments, including opportunities for Canadian companies seeking to expand production and participate in allied supply chains.

Arctic and northern sovereignty

Budget 2026 includes several measures to strengthen connectivity, infrastructure, and security in Canada's North.

- **Mackenzie Valley Highway:** Proposed federal funding for the construction and certain maintenance costs of an approximately 800-kilometre all-season highway connecting northern communities.
- **Northern infrastructure:** Continued work to improve transportation and infrastructure that support economic development and Canada's northern presence.
- **Arctic surveillance:** Advancing capabilities to improve domain awareness and continental defence.
- **Nuclear energy:** DND is assessing the potential for Canadian-controlled microreactors to provide heat and electricity to remote and northern facilities and operations.

Other measures supporting Canada's defence industry

The Budget also includes several government-wide initiatives relevant to Canadian defence businesses, manufacturers, and technology companies.

- **Strategic Response Fund:** $1 billion over six years, beginning in 2028-29, to support large-scale research, development, and innovation projects.
- **Critical minerals:** $2.3 billion in investments to strengthen domestic production and processing, including $424.4 million to renew the Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy.

- **Productivity Mega Deduction:** Reducing the marginal effective tax rate on new business investment from 13% to 6.4%, encouraging businesses to invest in Canadian manufacturing and production.
- **Sovereign AI:** Enabling Canadian AI companies to access 500 MW of sovereign computing capacity through new financing tools.
- **Intellectual property:** Improving commercialization of publicly funded research, strengthening patent transparency, and supporting Canadian-developed technologies.
- **Investment incentives:** Introducing tax measures to encourage investment and reinvestment in Canadian businesses, including a proposed capital gains exemption for eligible investments.
- **Federal financing:** Advancing the proposed integration of BDC and EDC, alongside changes to the Canadian Commercial Corporation, to better support Canadian businesses and exporters.
- **Aerospace and emergency preparedness:** Up to $2.5 billion in financing through EDC to help De Havilland Canada expand waterbomber production in Alberta.

Additional national security measures

Budget 2026 also proposes:

- Expanding the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's capabilities and presence, including in the North and internationally.
- Strengthening cybersecurity requirements for aircraft, airports, and aviation systems through proposed amendments to the Aeronautics Act.
- Supporting the Canadian Cyber Defence Collective's Strategic Forum.
- Supporting the acquisition, remediation, and operation of the National Field of Honour in Pointe-Claire, Québec.

Additional information

The full Budget and supporting materials are available here:

Budget 2026: https://budget.canada.ca/2026/home-accueil-en.html

Chapter 5 – A Safe and Sovereign Canada: https://budget.canada.ca/2026/report-rapport/chap5-en.html

As these initiatives move forward, we look forward to continuing our engagement with stakeholders and partners across the country. Your expertise and continued collaboration are important to strengthening Canada's defence capabilities and supporting the growth of our domestic defence industry.

For any questions or follow-up, please don't hesitate to reach out to anyone on our team for other questions related to your region:

- **Western Canada and the North:** Quinn Rinke – quinn.rinke@forces.ca

- **Atlantic Canada:** Sam Serviss – sam.serviss@forces.ca
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Thank you for your continued engagement and partnership, and for those of you whom I have not yet had the chance to meet – I look forward to our paths crossing soon.

Best,
Dana

Dana O'Born
Chief of Staff | Minister of National Defence
Department of National Defence | Government of Canada
dana.oborn@forces.gc.ca / Tel : (343) 571 4983

Remembrance Dinner 2026



Lt Gov NS @LtGovNS Nov 4 posted (pitcures https://x.com/LtGovNS/status/2118178681793233043):
It was a pleasure to join @RUSI_NS tonight for Remembrance Dinner at historic RA Park. Thanks VAdm (Ret) Dusty Miller, Major (Ret) John McLearn and all guests for a warm welcome and wonderful evening.

A highly successful occasion!

Resilience in the Military

(From *Politico,* a political newsfeed)
The Canadian Armed Forces is commissioning a research paper on resilience in the military. The tender document (https://canadabuys.canada.ca/sites/default/files/webform/tender_notice/112672/w4938-26-315s-a1---rfp---understanding-resilience---english.pdf) lays out expectations: 8,000-12,000 words, double-spaced in MS Word, Chicago-style citations. The contractor must disclose any use of AI tools in their work.

Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) International Outlook, 30 October-12 November, 2026
Selected Information

Canada:
"Canada receives first F-35 jets from U.S., as full order remains under review"

Canada / European Union: "Canada and the European Union building together an Alliance for the Future"

"Ottawa vows to prepare for all contingencies, 'including war,' in national-security plan"

The World:
Algeria / Niger: "Algeria's president orders troop deployment to neighbouring Niger"

Ethiopia: "Ethiopia says it received Russian Su-35 jets, S-400 air defence systems to follow"

Europe: "Fresh wave of fridge cyberattacks hits European supermarkets"

Indonesia: "Indonesia deploys over 20,000 troops to Jakarta amid wiretapping probe"


Poland / Europe: "Poland launches major border operation as activity in Russia fuels concern over possible "serious provocation""

The Koreas: "North Korea fires multiple missiles in fourth weapons launch in a month, Seoul says"

Türkiye / Greece: "Three Arab states back Greece in dispute over Turkey-Libya maritime accord"

United Kingdom: "Royal Navy Conducts First Drone Tests from HMS Queen Elizabeth"

"Who Repairs the Internet in Wartime?"
By Anita Nikolich and Andrew Gallo,
War on the Rocks, November 5, 2026.



The article discusses undersea telecommunications, infrastructure vulnerability, particularly during wartime.

Canada has thousands of kilometers of undersea telecommunications cables connecting various islands and regions on all three coasts.

While there are three undersea cable laying and repair ship based in Halifax (IT Integrity, IT Intrepid and IT Infinity) they are all privately owned and operated (IT International Telecom) and all registered in Barbados. The article proposes, among other measures, that the USA

establish a fleet of government-operated cable repair vessels as a wartime contingency. What action should Canada take to assure the integrity of its vast undersea network, as a means of enhancing national resilience?

SAC Notes

OBSERVATION ON WORLD AFFAIRS

Issues to Watch

US mid-terms have been a bit of a shocker. Will the Trump administration try to continue to ignore Congress and rule by presidential decrees? Will newly elected and disenchanted members of Congress be willing to regain some of the powers of Congress ceded to the Executive Branch? This is just the start of two years of a quagmire. Will the courts intervene? Will the Congress add to the Supreme Court?

The formation of an Israeli coalition government after a near tie during the 27 October 2026 elections. Will the Israeli Arab Parties support Gen Eisenkot's centre right party and replace Netanyahu ? Gen Eisenkot has been selected to form Government; will he develop relations with the Arab parties?

The Houthis have become a major threat across much of the Middle East. It is a proxy of the Iranian regime. Its missile and drone forces have proven formidable and a true disrupter to any peace efforts and continue attacks on Saudi Arabia?

How far will Trump go to achieve trade agreements with Canada and Mexico? Others? Ongoing issue.

Will Xi face opposition in the fifth plenum (ongoing now) or will he enhance his control over the Party? Not apparently, but many Xi supporters in the PLA are now gone. Who are the new generals and whom are they loyal to at this time?

Ukraine has achieved momentum against Russia on the battlefield retaking more ground than Russia this past three months. Will Ukraine achieve the same in the long-distance war using massive numbers of long-range drones? Ukraine's ballistic missiles are now available or soon will be especially the long-range FP 9.

O Canada

No final answer is forthcoming in regard to the selection of the new fighter aircraft for the air force. Despite the length of time already spent on the original selection of the F 35, politicians continue to play games and apparently are happier with our pilots flying an aircraft older than they are in modern combat. Whatever the choice, make it sooner rather than later. The lives of our aviators is more important than the appearance of doing the right thing politically.

The decision to contract for eight submarines versus twelve is a concerning decision. Canada has three coats. One needs four boats to guarantee a boat available at all times at sea. We have three seas, four times three is twelve as a minimum, Canada had three or four submarines but that was a decision based on the submarines being a training vehicle for anti-submarine forces our own and NATO that occasionally performed operational missions, Decisions like this prove once again that we need to take the politics out of procurement. Stick with twelve boats.

The Army is a **no fail** organization both on overseas missions or on domestic operations. If the Army fails, so fails the country. The regular force has issued a new Commander's Intent called Inflection Point 2025. It sees the disbandment of all the current divisions based on geography, history, regional and historical need. It sees the creation of a manoeuvre division, a domestic operations division with ten formations under command across the entire country, a training division and a support division.

LGen Wright suggests Canada doesn't have the Army it needs and Inflection Point doesn't come close either nor does it seem to do this in the rest of the paper. Most countries involved in current combat bear no resemblance to the "new vision." Almost all the countries involve a very large reserve and a very small regular Army. The reserve is based on folks who have received national service training as a conscript. Ukraine against all odds recreated this system on the fly. It has established 85 combat brigades that are based on NATO training and built them into Corps encompassing a number of combat indirect fire brigades (including Drones used as an ammunition type) and support brigades under a Corps HQ.

Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel all have something similar although Israel uses divisions. The point is almost all the combat power in the Army is reserve. Canada apparently intends to use a very expensive regular Army in one glorious division and leave a badly equipped ill-trained resource scarce reserve division that is scattered under an inadequate HQs to do all of Canada. This really needs to be looked at very carefully and a real new model built based on Corps and more importantly geographically based on mass national service reserve soldiers. Having all the eggs in one basket is a terrible idea at best.

In a separate paper, it may be suggested that this "new vision" was tried before in the mid-1980s resulting in the FMC division as a training vehicle called the FMC division which used the RV series of exercises from RV 81 to RV 92. FMC HQs also developed mobilization specifications which later were used in the development of reserve training which took an untrained member and within six months created a soldier capable of performing basic tasks. It also created a system for increasing the skill sets for the needs of each occupation. Inflection Point seems to recreate this program Army it needs; although it admits that the program is a work in progress, so back to the future of the late 1970s and 80s.

In the meantime, there are very serious weaknesses in the domestic operations division. It has ten reserve formations from coast to coast to coast. The planners apparently did not understand the complexity of geography. They appear to have no understanding of "water' whether in BC or the Atlantic Provinces and how this affects movement for domestic operations such as an Op Lentus. This division HQ in Montreal is ill-equipped to perform this task. There is a

reason Canada has always considered geography in its organizational establishment charts. Not all the lessons of the past are bad.

In relation to the SPOD, the Germans were able to eliminate the St Lawrence River and the ports on it fairly fast. The river canalizes the ships leaving the port. It is why Halifax with its sheltered Bedford basin, deep harbour, rail, road and air links was always used. Once you leave the harbour mouth you have access to the entire Atlantic. Where is the APOD/SPOD for the West coast? At least read some history. Preparation and planning are not evident in this paper with Commander's Intent.

United States

The US midterms are over, and the Democratic Party has made huge in-roads across the entire nation and will control the Senate and the House of Representatives. Two Republican judges are near retirement or have previously opined about retirement so potentially the Supreme Court may be at play as well after 3 January 2027.

Generally, except for the "One Big Beautiful Bill" Trump has used Presidential Decrees to govern the country. Many of these decrees are being appealed in the courts of the land with considerable success.

The first issues to be tackled by the new Congress are tariffs and impeachment of the Secretary of Defence (War). Affordability of living in the US is one of the main reasons for the Republican defeat. This being said, will the Trump Administration likely continue with its use of Presidential Decree until the power over the purse strings finally puts a stop to such actions.

The other question is whether Trump will continue the war with Iran. Certainly it seems that it could be true as the administration has cut off funding to Israel at the end of the calendar year. At the same time, US forces continue to grow in the Middle East in some form but not at fixed bases. The capability may still be present whether for physical action or as a psychological warfare instrument. Time will tell, but both paths are currently open in one form or the other.

Moldova

Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan states that a state actor is responsible for recent hacking attacks on Moldovan IT systems in recent weeks. The attacks have been debilitating and have affected government databases including theft of private information. Russia is not mentioned but he stated that the list of potential culprits is small.

Russia is continuing a campaign of misinformation, influence operations, cyber attacks, sabotage and increasingly drone attacks. Overall Europe has increased its awareness and capabilities to thwart these types of attacks, but evolving tactics have made this difficult. The information comes from Euronews dated 8 November 2026. https://www.msn.com/en-sg/news/other/moldova-suspects-state-actor-behind-major-cyberattack-pm-tells-euronews/ar-AA2gG6fS?ocid=BingNewsSerp

Moldova has been under continuous attack by Russia, so it is likely a Russian attack or an attack sponsored by Russia through a criminal organization. These issues have resulted in the possibility of Russian citizens being required to apply for a Moldovan visa. Moldova is also receiving help from the EU to counter these ongoing threats.

Georgia

Georgia is still subject to opposition demonstrations every night. The government is continuing its efforts in the courts to have opposition parties declared illegal. Giorgi Sharashidze, an MP from the opposition Gakharia for Georgia party, has accused the Georgia Dream party of trying to create "opposition" parties to replace the actual opposition parties as well. First have the parties declared illegal then create new parties to go through the motions of opposition but firmly under the control of the Georgia Dream party.

The EU Enlargement Report has noted Georgia's difficulties and the actions of the ruling party. It suggests that Georgia has been taking steps backwards rather than making increased efforts to join the EU. The de facto head of Georgia Dream, Bedzina Ivanishvili is largely considered a pro-Russian stooge and has worked steadily to move the country closer to Russia. Thus far they have been largely successful but are not popular with the general population.

Belarus

Belarus continues to imprison opposition, most recently, it was charged with and found guilty of "insulting the authorities and extremism." And sentenced to three years in prison and a large fine. His actual "crime" was to be in opposition to the war against Ukraine. Although Belarus is not at war with Ukraine, his position of leadership and his opposition to the Russian war efforts bring him into direct conflict with the current Belarus leadership of Alexandre Lukashenko. Lukashenko has very little choice but to take strong measures against the war as it could lead to a wider opposition to his rule.

Belarus has also been told it cannot compete in the IIHA tournament this year along with Russia. Canada is the host and will not allow their participation.

Israel Iran Conflict including Proxies

Israel's election is over but without a definitive answer. Binyamin Natanyahu's party won 53 seats and is the single largest party in the Knesset. However, the main opposition party has the capability of potentially joining with the two Arab parties for an actual majority of 67 out 120 seats. There is considerable doubt whether Gabi Eisenkot will be willing to work with the Arab parties, nor is he necessarily willing to work with right wing parties leaving the choices to be very limited.

Israel continues to hold most of Gaza along the yellow line. Most of the Palestinian population is found on a narrow strip under considerable strain. Israel continues to kill known Hamas operatives usually through air attacks thus creating conditions for civilian casualties.

In Lebanon, Israel is continuing to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure as they very slowly withdraw from Lebanon. As mentioned in previous notes, polling of the Lebanese citizenry has shown a large majority want Hezbollah disarmed so they cannot involve Lebanon in

Iran's proxy war against Israel. It is the Lebanese who pay without having any say in the first place.

Iran and its proxies, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis continue to disrupt the Middle East. Yet Israel is condemned for defending itself against acts of terror. The settlers in Israel and certain political parties there are less than ideal. Unlike Iran and its proxies, eventually, these actions often go to court although there are exceptions. Every country has the right of self-defence…except Israel apparently.

Ukraine Russia Conflict

The war of missiles and drones is continuing with both countries inflicting massive damage on the other. Both economies are in poor shape, although Ukraine has friends and Russia generally does not. Peace talks in Abu Dhabi between three countries: the Us, Russia and Ukraine. The US President has stated that there will be a European wide peace agreement. The Europeans are not invited to the table, yet an agreement is supposed to include them as well. The Europeans have a problem with that issue and the likely answer from Europe will be a firm 'no.'

The war on the ground has turned around as Ukraine has been able to drive Russian forces away from areas in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and inflicting severe casualties on Russia. This month Ukraine inflicted more than 54 k killed or seriously wounded. The highest casualty numbers for a single month the entire war. Russia has lost more than 400 k so far in 2026. Russia has not been able to replace these casualties; recruiting is less than half the casualties for the last three months. Even Russia cannot sustain these losses indefinitely. Economically, Russia is defeated and has been forced to "steal" from its own citizens to find sufficient funding. This also is not sustainable.

Russia has not changed its demands and has demanded that NATO be rolled back to the pre-1997 members which would eliminate most of Eastern Europe. It should be noted that Russia is the only country that can stop the war by simply adopting a ceasefire and withdrawing all its forces from Ukraine. Until that occurs, the war will likely continue.

China

The fifth Plenum is over, and it appears Xi has survived the session, however, what are we really looking at over the remaining period of Xi's third term? We do not have a good reading of the output of the session. The idea that the Party will concentrate on continuing the anti-corruption campaign, During the session no less than 32 high ranking members of the party was expelled including 16 high ranking members of the military. Most of those expelled had been Xi loyalists.

One other aspect is the continuing purge of the military. In 2023, there were 44 officers of full General rank, within a year this number had been reduced to 42 and in this session only five officers remained of General rank. More interestingly, all three Generals who have served as Xi's Chief of Staff were amongst this number. It called into question whether Xi continues to control the military? If so, who has now taken control. One suggestion is that the "Reformist" follow the methods of Hu Juntao which take a very different approach.

Xi has built up his power towards the Maoist cult of the strong leader. A single all powerful leader who would remain in power until death or until someone forces them out. The Fifth Plenum announcement discussed the need for "democratic decision making" a form of "collective leadership" which is supposed to be the Party's highest principle, a principle Hu Jintao was noted for during his time as the Party Chairman. It did not sound as though it supported the leadership cult followed by Xi. So, who is next? Will Xi be required to step down at the end of his third term?

Perhaps Xi is still in control, but it is now contested in some form especially as China's Eastern theatre command is exercising all around Taiwan with the support of other theatre commands. The PLA is badly crippled after the loss of so many senior officers who also tended to be commanders of theatre commands and key force generating organizations. None of the remaining five generals have major command experience and tended to be on political leadership in the PLA with three out of five being air force or Navy not ground force commanders. New promotions have not been announced.

Another issue is the sheer availability of suitable amphibious ships. Asia Times article "China's amphibious surge confronts a Taiwan invasion's hard math" found at link: https://asiatimes.com/2026/11/chinas-amphibious-surge-confronts-a-taiwan-invasions-hard-math/. The article suggests that they only have sufficient capability to land a division of approximately 20 k personnel. China has the largest merchant marine fleet in the world, but how many of those ships could readily be converted to be usable in a major assault? In recent years, China has built specialized vessels capable of being used as a temporary wharf allowing vehicles to simply offload from commercial ferries, but specialized vessels are still too few. The article also underestimates the numbers of Taiwanese military personnel available. Taiwan maintains a massive mobilizable reserve of millions. It is suggested that even with specialized ships available from commercial trade it is unlikely China would have the ability to take the island state. Now they have to regenerate capable and competent senior staff as well.

Will China continue preparations against Taiwan, or will they continue to add pressure without actually entering into a combat phase? Time will tell, but major air and sea activities around Taiwan appear to be hitting a new high level.

COMMENTARY ON CENTRAL AFRICA AND AFRICA-WIDE STRATEGIC INFLUENCE ASSESSMENT (7-11 NOVEMBER 2026)

SUBJECT: Strategic, Military, Diplomatic, Economic and Humanitarian Developments Across Africa, 7–11 November 2026, with Essential Earlier Context

REFERENCES

A. Open-source institutional documentation and reporting available through 11 November 2026, including the African Union Commission, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Global Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, United States Department of State, United States Trade Representative, United States Treasury, World Health Organization

(WHO), United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), South African Police Service, and relevant African governmental and military communications.

B. Independent and specialist reporting from Reuters, Associated Press, BBC, Al Jazeera, Africa Intelligence, Intelligence Online, Bloomberg, The Hill Times, Africa Defense Forum, Critical Threats Project, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Defense News, Business Insider Africa, Military Africa, The Guardian Nigeria, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, C4ADS-related reporting and other regional publications.

C. This assessment distinguishes independently documented actions, official announcements, attributed allegations, future intentions and analytical judgments. Reporting derived from a common original source is not treated as independent corroboration.

PURPOSE

A. To assess the principal military, diplomatic, economic, intelligence and humanitarian developments affecting Africa as of 11 November 2026, with particular attention to Central Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and relations with external powers.

B. To examine Russian military activities, Africa Corps logistics, foreign-national recruitment associated with the war in Ukraine, regional security cooperation and the implications of changing United States trade and diplomatic policies.

C. To evaluate Canadian engagement and identify measurable opportunities for strengthening security relationships, economic partnerships and institutional cooperation while respecting African sovereignty and regional priorities.

D. To provide a concise, decision-useful assessment supported by explicit confidence judgments and distinguish confirmed developments from matters requiring further corroboration.

I. EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT

A. The reporting period demonstrates an expanding relationship between external strategic competition and Africa's internal security challenges. Russia is maintaining military relationships through Africa Corps, defence supply arrangements and naval diplomacy. New reporting has identified maritime logistics networks connecting Russian departure points with African ports associated with military equipment deliveries. These developments warrant assessment of the sustainability, reach and strategic implications of Russia's military presence.

B. A C4ADS investigation reported by Defense News on 10 November identifies twelve vessels with operational connections to Russian military shipments during 2023–2026, including ten reportedly subject to United States sanctions. The investigation highlights Conakry, Tobruk and Lomé as important logistical locations. Although the research examines earlier vessel movements, its November publication provides additional evidence concerning the organization and geographical reach of Russian military supply networks.

C. A significant new development concerns the recruitment of foreign nationals for participation in the Russia–Ukraine war. On 9 November, South African authorities announced the detention of nine foreign nationals suspected of preparing to travel abroad to participate in the conflict. The investigation involved domestic authorities, Interpol and international law-enforcement partners. This development reinforces concerns about foreign military recruitment, potential deception, trafficking and the responsibilities of national authorities.

D. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo remains affected by armed conflict and incomplete implementation of diplomatic arrangements. Reporting dated 11 November describes renewed military advances involving the Front Révolutionnaire National (FRN), including fighting around Bunyakiri in South Kivu. Disagreements between Kinshasa and Kigali concerning withdrawal arrangements and the neutralization of armed groups continue to complicate negotiations.

E. The Bundibugyo-virus Ebola outbreak constitutes an immediate humanitarian and regional health-security emergency. WHO reported 10,920 confirmed Congolese cases and 5,323 deaths as of 7 November. CDC reporting subsequently recorded 10,990 confirmed cases and 5,354 deaths in the DRC as of 8 November. Continued transmission, displacement and insecurity place pressure on national healthcare capacity and regional surveillance systems.

F. Security and humanitarian conditions across the Sahel remain concerning. ACLED's 10–11 November reporting identifies continued militant activity in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, while UNHCR reported nearly 64,000 people fleeing northern Nigeria into Niger during 2026. These developments illustrate how insurgency, disrupted economic activity and population displacement place additional demands on regional institutions.

G. Canada has demonstrated concrete diplomatic and development activity during the reporting period. Between 8 and 10 November, Secretary of State Randeep Sarai visited Zambia, participated in the inauguration of Canada's High Commission, signed an economic and development cooperation memorandum, and announced more than $10.5 million in funding. These actions provide measurable evidence of engagement under Canada's Africa Strategy, although project completion and sustained benefits remain future benchmarks.

H. China continues to expand scientific and technological cooperation. South Africa's Department of Science, Technology and Innovation confirmed participation in the China–Africa Innovation Cooperation and Development Forum in Wuhan from 10 to 13 November, involving discussions on space technology, artificial intelligence, digital systems and applied research. The event illustrates ongoing cooperation beyond traditional infrastructure and resource investment.

I. The principal analytical conclusion is differentiated. Russia continues to develop selected military relationships and associated logistics; China is maintaining substantial technological and commercial engagement; the United States retains financial, diplomatic and security instruments; and Canada has demonstrated new institutional and funding commitments.

African governments remain independent actors pursuing distinct national and regional objectives.

Confidence Assessment: High for official South African, Canadian, UNHCR and WHO reporting; Moderate to High for documented Russian military logistics and ongoing regional insecurity; Moderate for projected strategic consequences and the durability of international partnerships.

II. RUSSIAN MILITARY LOGISTICS AND AFRICA CORPS OPERATIONS

A. Defense News published a C4ADS investigation on 10 November describing maritime logistics routes associated with Russian military equipment shipments into Africa. The investigation identified twelve vessels connected to Russian military transport activity, with ten reportedly subject to United States sanctions. Ports highlighted include Tobruk in Libya, Conakry in Guinea and Lomé in Togo. These findings represent a significant new investigative contribution, although the underlying vessel movements span several years.

B. The investigation relied on maritime tracking records, satellite imagery, local photographs and related open-source evidence. Researchers linked certain port arrivals with subsequent movements of military equipment, including armoured vehicles and other heavy materiel. Such correlations can establish credible logistical patterns, but the cargo aboard every individual vessel and its ultimate recipient cannot always be independently confirmed.

C. Maritime access is particularly important to Russian operations in landlocked Sahel states. Equipment unloaded at coastal ports may subsequently move through national transportation networks to destination governments. Such arrangements involve shipping operators, port authorities, transit infrastructure and the cooperation of several institutions.

D. Libya remains strategically relevant because of existing Russian military relationships with authorities in the country's eastern region. Tobruk offers access to Mediterranean transportation networks, while Conakry and Lomé connect maritime activity with West African overland routes. These locations possess distinct political and logistical characteristics and should not be interpreted as interchangeable military facilities.

E. C4ADS also identified Pointe-Noire in the Republic of the Congo as a possible developing logistics location. The available evidence indicates relevant vessel movements but does not conclusively establish the nature of all shipments or the existence of a permanent Russian military logistics installation.

F. The operational significance of these arrangements lies in their potential to sustain equipment, personnel and maintenance requirements over time. Military relationships become more consequential when supported by recurring transportation and supply arrangements rather than isolated deliveries.

G. Assessment. The newly published investigation provides a stronger basis for evaluating Russian military logistics in Africa. Nevertheless, military shipments, commercial shipping,

naval visits and diplomatic cooperation must remain analytically distinct. The principal intelligence requirement is to establish the nature, continuity and consequences of reported military supply arrangements without attributing military purposes to unrelated civilian activity.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High for the documented investigation and recurring maritime patterns; Moderate for individual cargo destinations and reported military connections; Low to Moderate for the possible emergence of additional permanent logistics facilities.

III. RUSSIAN NAVAL DIPLOMACY AND AFRICAN MARITIME RELATIONSHIPS

A. Russia's Baltic Fleet training ship Perekop visited Lagos between 6 and 8 November 2026. Subsequent reporting from Nigerian naval sources and the Russian diplomatic mission confirmed professional engagement involving Russian and Nigerian naval representatives.

B. The visit included discussions on naval training, maritime security, professional development and possible future cooperation. Reported activities also included limited joint manoeuvres involving a Nigerian patrol vessel and helicopter. Such interactions **provide** opportunities for professional familiarization and the development of military-to-military relationships.

C. The presence of African naval personnel undergoing training through Russian institutions is relevant to longer-term professional cooperation. Training exchanges can establish relationships among officers and technical personnel that continue beyond the immediate duration of a port visit.

D. The diplomatic significance of the Lagos engagement must be distinguished from operational commitments. A naval training visit does not independently establish a military alliance, permanent basing rights or the transfer of operational authority. Nigeria maintains diverse international security relationships and retains responsibility for determining its own maritime priorities.

E. Russian naval diplomacy and the maritime equipment shipments discussed in Section II involve different activities. The former demonstrates professional contact and diplomatic visibility; the latter concerns logistical support for military operations. Combining these activities without distinction would overstate the available evidence.

F. Assessment. Moscow continues to employ naval engagement as an instrument of defence diplomacy. Its practical significance should be assessed through sustained professional exchanges, formal cooperation arrangements and African institutional priorities rather than ceremonial activity alone.

Confidence Assessment: High for the reported Lagos visit and professional discussions; Moderate for prospective training and maritime cooperation; Low for unverified claims concerning permanent military access or future naval deployments.

IV. FOREIGN-NATIONAL RECRUITMENT FOR THE RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR

A. On 9 November, South Africa's Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation announced the arrest of nine foreign nationals suspected of preparing to travel abroad for military participation in the Russia–Ukraine war. The suspects were aged between 20 and 26 and were apprehended at OR Tambo International Airport and a nearby hotel.

B. The operation involved Interpol, South African police intelligence, specialized investigative units and international law-enforcement cooperation. Authorities indicated that the individuals were expected to face proceedings under South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.

C. The official announcement did not disclose the individuals' nationalities or conclusively identify the armed force each intended to join. Accordingly, their alleged destination and purpose should not be presented as established criminal facts before the investigation and judicial process determine the relevant circumstances.

D. The arrests occur within a broader pattern of international concern regarding recruitment for Russia's military operations in Ukraine. Amnesty International has documented allegations of deceptive employment offers, coercive contracts, exploitation and deployment to combat positions affecting foreign nationals from multiple regions. The September research remains relevant background, but the new South African intervention is the principal development within this assessment period.

E. Individual recruitment circumstances may differ substantially. Some persons may knowingly seek foreign military employment, while others may reportedly be induced by promises of civilian work, financial benefits or immigration opportunities. Investigations must distinguish informed participation, deception, coercion, trafficking and violations of domestic legislation.

F. Recruitment networks create potential transnational security and humanitarian concerns involving travel arrangements, financial intermediaries, consular assistance, exploitation and the protection of affected individuals. Effective responses require cooperation among competent national authorities and international partners, with due regard for jurisdiction, human rights and applicable law.

G. Reports concerning foreign-national military casualties must also be assessed carefully. Aggregate numbers should not be attributed to particular nationalities or continents without reliable supporting documentation. Reported casualties, confirmed identities and the legal status of individuals involved are separate evidentiary questions.

H. Assessment. The South African arrests demonstrate the importance of coordinated law-enforcement and intelligence cooperation in responding to suspected foreign military recruitment. The broader issue warrants sustained attention, but allegations must remain properly attributed, and investigations must respect the responsibilities and sovereignty of participating governments.

Confidence Assessment: High for the official arrests, investigative participation and applicable South African legislation; Moderate for the broader recruitment patterns documented by independent investigators; Low for unverified casualty totals and the circumstances of unidentified recruit

V. MALI AND THE SAHEL: INSURGENCY, DRONE OPERATIONS AND CIVILIAN SECURITY

A. Reporting published by Africa Defense Forum on 10 November describes allegations concerning the role of Africa Corps personnel in drone operations conducted in northern Mali. Investigations referenced by the publication include analysis of imagery, drone wreckage and possible command relationships involving Russian personnel.

B. The article attributed to ACLED a total of 89 civilian deaths associated with 49 airstrikes between April and August 2026 involving Malian and Africa Corps operations. These figures represent historical incident data introduced in November reporting, not new fatalities occurring within the current assessment period.

C. Allegations concerning operational responsibility and civilian casualties are serious and require case-specific examination. Visual evidence, witness testimony, official statements and independently established incident circumstances should be differentiated. The existence of a military system or foreign adviser does not independently establish responsibility for every reported strike.

D. ACLED's weekly update published on 10 November identifies continued security pressures in Mali, including activity by Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), economic restrictions in the Kayes region, attacks along the RN6 corridor and indications that the Azawad Liberation Front may be preparing further operations in northern Mali.

E. ACLED also reported continued militant activity in Niger and Burkina Faso. Its 11 November Burkina Faso update identifies JNIM territorial competition in Centre-Est and threats affecting commercial and transportation centres. Its Niger reporting describes renewed Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) activity along the Mali–Niger border.

F. These developments illustrate that military operations and insurgent competition can affect commercial transportation, mining, food distribution, public administration and civilian movement. Tactical military successes do not independently establish lasting security improvements, particularly where public services and local economic conditions remain fragile.

G. Assessment. The current reporting indicates that Sahel insecurity remains multidimensional, involving armed competition, civilian vulnerability, economic disruption and external military relationships. The effectiveness of security assistance should be measured through sustainable civilian protection and national institutional capacity rather than combat activity or foreign military presence alone.

Confidence Assessment: High for the publication of ACLED's November regional assessments and continuing insecurity; Moderate for attributed civilian casualty figures and allegations of foreign command responsibility; Moderate to Low for projected insurgent movements and territorial outcomes.

VI. EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES

A. The Critical Threats Project's 11 November Congo War Security Review identifies a significant FRN offensive through the Kahuzi-Biega National Park area and along the RN3 transportation corridor in South Kivu. The operation reportedly resulted in the capture of Bunyakiri, with further fighting recorded around neighbouring locations.

B. The assessment documents military activity between 6 and 10 November, including advances by FRN-aligned forces and counterattacks by pro-Congolese government formations. Individual territorial claims originate from multiple parties and remain subject to verification as battlefield positions change.

C. The FRN's development as a political and military actor associated with former President Joseph Kabila complicates an already fragmented conflict environment. Relationships among political leaders, armed groups, local commanders and external supporters require independent examination rather than assumptions of unified command or identical objectives.

D. Africa Intelligence reported on 11 November that Kinshasa and Kigali are expected to meet in Switzerland on 19 November. According to the published summary, disagreements remain over the conditions and sequencing of Rwandan withdrawal and the neutralization of the FDLR. The proposed meeting is a future diplomatic event, not evidence of a completed settlement.

E. The continuing military activity demonstrates the difference between negotiated commitments and operational compliance. The presence of diplomatic frameworks does not establish that armed parties have ceased hostilities or that civilian communities are receiving effective protection.

F. The political environment remains sensitive. Reports of contacts among Congolese political actors and regional diplomatic initiatives should be assessed according to the reliability of the original sources. Preliminary discussions do not necessarily represent formal negotiations or agreed political outcomes.

G. Assessment. The principal new development is the reported FRN advance in South Kivu, accompanied by continuing diplomatic disagreements. Regional stabilization requires practical implementation of security arrangements, credible monitoring, protection of civilians and sustained engagement by the parties directly involved.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High for the documented pattern of fighting and the reported Bunyakiri offensive; Moderate for individual battlefield claims and

proposed negotiations; Low to Moderate for uncorroborated political contacts and inferred motivations.

VII. ETHIOPIA, SUDAN AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

A. Reporting published on 9 November by Africa Intelligence describes continued diplomatic tensions between Ethiopia and Sudan, including reported difficulties involving communications between Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Sudanese military leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The publicly available reporting supports concern regarding bilateral relations but does not independently establish all motives attributed to either government.

B. Ethiopia's internal security environment remains unstable, including renewed tensions in Tigray and other conflict-affected areas. Regional military developments and political disputes may influence relations with neighbouring governments, but allegations of external involvement require separate corroboration.

C. On 10 November, Kenyan authorities reported continued monitoring of insecurity near Moyale following violence on the Ethiopian side of the border. Kenyan officials acknowledged refugee movements, pressure on local security resources and concerns about stray gunfire crossing the frontier. They also described communication with Ethiopian counterparts and engagement with affected communities.

D. These movements constitute a tangible cross-border consequence of regional instability. Displacement can place pressure on accommodation, medical services, schools and local economic activity. Refugee protection and border-security requirements must be addressed without treating displaced civilians as responsible for the violence from which they have fled.

E. Sudan's humanitarian situation also remains critical. In a joint statement dated 6 November, UNHCR and IOM warned that approximately 15.4 million people in Sudan required emergency shelter and household assistance, while available resources would allow assistance to only a fraction of those in need. Although issued one day before the principal reporting window, this represents an immediately relevant assessment of the humanitarian conditions entering 7–11 November.

F. The deterioration of humanitarian assistance and continuing regional tensions demonstrate the importance of separating political disputes from civilian protection requirements. External partnerships may provide useful technical or financial assistance, but effective responses depend on humanitarian access, local institutions and cooperation with legitimate authorities.

G. Assessment. The Horn of Africa faces overlapping military, diplomatic and humanitarian pressures. November reporting identifies practical cross-border consequences in Kenya and continuing concerns involving Ethiopia and Sudan. Future regional stability will depend upon diplomatic engagement, restraint, protection of civilians and sustained humanitarian capacity.

Confidence Assessment: High for Kenyan official reporting and UNHCR/IOM humanitarian findings; Moderate for regional diplomatic tensions and displacement

trends; Low to Moderate for allegations concerning the motives and intentions of individual political or military leaders.

VIII. NIGERIA AND NIGER: CROSS-BORDER DISPLACEMENT AND SECURITY COOPERATION

A. UNHCR reported on 10 November that nearly 64,000 people had arrived in Niger from northern Nigeria during 2026 while fleeing violence involving armed groups and criminal activity. Niger was already hosting more than 500,000 refugees and asylum seekers, including approximately 327,500 Nigerians.

B. The principal receiving regions include Diffa and Tahoua. UNHCR reported that Diffa had received more than 23,000 arrivals since the beginning of the year, with children constituting more than two-thirds of that group. Humanitarian services remain under significant pressure.

C. The new UNHCR briefing identifies serious shortages involving shelter, food, potable water, sanitation and healthcare. Limited registration and restricted resources further complicate the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide assistance and monitor population needs.

D. The reported arrivals represent cumulative displacement during 2026 rather than a single event occurring on 10 November. Their significance lies in the current scale of humanitarian requirements and the continuing effect of insecurity on national and regional capacity.

E. Armed violence and civilian displacement create overlapping demands for border authorities, local administrations, humanitarian agencies and national security institutions. Appropriate cooperation must preserve civilian protection, distinguish refugees from armed actors and maintain lawful access to essential services.

F. Assessment. The Nigeria–Niger humanitarian situation requires continued regional engagement because insecurity extends beyond national borders through displacement and economic disruption. Sustainable responses depend upon both humanitarian assistance and improved civilian security in affected communities.

Confidence Assessment: High for UNHCR's November reporting, documented displacement and humanitarian needs; Moderate for the future direction of population movements and the expected effects of regional security measures.

IX. DRC EBOLA: HUMANITARIAN AND REGIONAL HEALTH SECURITY

A. WHO's Regional Office for Africa reported on 7 November that the Bundibugyo-virus Ebola outbreak in the DRC had reached 10,920 confirmed cases and 5,323 confirmed deaths. The outbreak affected 67 health zones across eight provinces and continued to demonstrate substantial transmission.

B. CDC reporting subsequently recorded 10,990 confirmed DRC cases and 5,354 deaths as of 8 November. These figures represent a later reporting point, not additional cases to be added to the WHO total. The distinction is essential for maintaining accurate epidemiological reporting.

C. WHO's November update identified continuing transmission in Ituri and North Kivu, with North Kivu contributing a growing proportion of recent cases. Insecurity, health-worker disruptions and difficulties conducting contact tracing continue to constrain response activities.

D. Regional cases associated with the outbreak have been recorded in Kenya and Nigeria. WHO reported that these importation events remained contained as of the latest situation report, with no new Kenyan case since 19 October and no identified secondary transmission in Nigeria. These dates are included only to establish the present containment status.

E. The outbreak remains a significant concern for civilian protection, healthcare access and regional economic activity. Population displacement and armed violence may complicate surveillance, while inadequate medical infrastructure can delay detection and treatment.

F. On 10 November, the CDC issued a further order continuing certain entry restrictions related to the outbreak. This demonstrates that international authorities continue to consider the situation a public-health security concern. Such measures require careful assessment under applicable legal and epidemiological standards.

G. Clinical research may offer future improvements, but experimental vaccines and treatment approaches must not be presented as approved and generally available interventions. The immediate priorities remain effective surveillance, infection prevention, supportive care, contact tracing and community cooperation.

H. Assessment. The outbreak remains an urgent international health-security emergency with direct implications for governance, humanitarian access and regional stability. Continued coordination among national health authorities and international institutions is essential, particularly where conflict and displacement obstruct response operations.

Confidence Assessment: High for dated WHO/CDC figures, the documented geographic distribution and continued transmission; Moderate for near-term epidemiological projections and the effectiveness of future interventions.

X. REGIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION: KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA

A. Reporting published on 11 November describes a Kenyan military technical delegation visiting South Africa's 7 Medical Battalion Group to examine cooperation in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear preparedness.

B. The engagement reportedly involved representatives associated with Kenya's military doctrine-development activities and specialists from the South African Military Health

Service. Discussions concerned institutional preparedness, technical procedures and the management of hazardous incidents.

C. Such engagements may strengthen professional relationships and allow participating institutions to exchange practical experience. Technical cooperation can support national emergency preparedness when integrated with domestic legal responsibilities and civilian response authorities.

D. The reported visit should not be interpreted as evidence of an imminent chemical, biological or nuclear threat. Preventive training and doctrine development are established components of professional military preparedness.

E. Assessment. The engagement provides an example of African-led defence and emergency-management cooperation. Its significance lies in strengthening institutional **capability and** professional exchanges rather than demonstrating an immediate operational security development.

Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High for the reported technical engagement; Moderate for anticipated institutional benefits; Low for unsupported inferences regarding specific imminent threats.

XI. UNITED STATES: TRADE POLICY, DIPLOMACY AND REGIONAL INFLUENCE

A. The United States continues to employ economic, diplomatic and security instruments in its African relationships. During the current reporting period, attention has focused on commercial cooperation, regional infrastructure and implementation of existing strategic arrangements.

B. On 11 November, the United States Department of State issued a statement marking Angola's independence anniversary, emphasizing bilateral relations, regional economic integration and cooperation involving the Lobito Corridor. The statement also highlighted energy, infrastructure, private investment and defence cooperation.

C. The Lobito Corridor is strategically relevant because it connects regional transportation infrastructure with commercial development in Southern and Central Africa. Its future economic significance depends upon completed investments, reliable transportation, market access and demonstrable benefits for participating countries.

D. The Critical Threats Project’s 11 November assessment also identifies a meeting of the United States–DRC Joint Steering Committee held in Paris on 5 November. Officials discussed implementation of the strategic partnership, commercial investment interests and potential infrastructure and mineral-sector cooperation. The available reporting did not identify major new financing commitments arising from that meeting.

E. The earlier November announcement concerning prospective changes to Rwanda's and South Africa's AGOA eligibility remains relevant to the broader American policy environment. The proposed effective date is 1 January 2027. As of 11 November, the measure should be treated as an announced intention rather than a completed termination.

F. American diplomatic and commercial engagement may create opportunities for cooperation with African governments seeking infrastructure, market access and investment. At the same time, the consequences of trade restrictions and other policy instruments must be assessed individually, recognizing differences among national economic and political circumstances.

G. Assessment. The United States retains substantial financial, diplomatic and commercial capabilities. The current period illustrates continuing engagement through regional infrastructure and strategic partnerships. The effectiveness of these initiatives will depend upon implementation, financing and sustained cooperation with the governments involved.

Confidence Assessment: High for official American statements and documented diplomatic engagements; Moderate for the implementation of proposed commercial projects and the economic effects of future policy measures.

XII. CANADA: STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT, DIPLOMATIC CAPACITY AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Canada’s Africa Strategy provides the framework for stronger diplomatic, commercial and development partnerships. During 8–10 November, Canada demonstrated practical engagement through Secretary of State Randeep Sarai's visit to Zambia, which focused on economic cooperation, regional trade and sustainable development.

B. The visit included the formal inauguration of Canada’s High Commission in Zambia. Secretary of State Sarai participated alongside senior Zambian officials, including Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Minister Mulambo Haimbe and Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane. The opening strengthens Canada's permanent diplomatic representation and institutional access.

C. Canada and Zambia also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Economic and Development Cooperation. The agreement addresses trade, investment, critical minerals and inclusive economic growth. It constitutes a new institutional commitment, although its ultimate significance depends on funded programmes and measurable outcomes.

D. Global Affairs Canada announced more than $10.5 million for four projects supporting development and institutional capacity. The principal commitments included $7.5 million for a Lobito Corridor economic-development initiative led by iDE Canada, $2 million for financial-sector supervision and capital-market development through Toronto Centre, and $823,867 for a project supporting women's leadership in peacekeeping and security institutions.

E. These commitments offer a more substantive basis for evaluating current Canadian engagement than generalized statements about future intentions. However, announced

financing must still be distinguished from completed expenditures, operating projects and sustainable economic benefits.

F. Reporting published by The Hill Times on 11 November indicates that Canada's special envoy position for Africa remained vacant approximately four months after the previous appointment concluded. The report references internal considerations concerning potential successors. The existence of a vacancy warrants attention, but the reasons for the appointment process and its effects on individual programmes should not be inferred without further evidence.

G. Questions have also been raised regarding the visibility of Canada's Africa Strategy in Budget 2026. The absence of an explicit policy reference does not independently establish that Africa-related funding or activities have ceased. The Zambia announcements demonstrate continuing commitments, while a full assessment of financing requires departmental and programme-level examination.

H. Canada's planned participation in Africa Tech Festival in Cape Town from 16 to 19 November provides a further prospective opportunity. The Trade Commissioner Service has announced a Canadian pavilion intended to connect Canadian companies with African partners in telecommunications, financial technology, cybersecurity and related sectors. Commercial outcomes remain to be determined after the event.

I. Assessment. Canada's November engagement with Zambia provides concrete evidence of renewed diplomatic and development activity. The continuing analytical challenge is to evaluate whether institutional expansion and financial commitments produce functioning projects, stronger commercial relationships and sustained local benefits. Administrative vacancies and questions concerning policy coordination should be examined alongside these documented achievements rather than treated as evidence of complete policy inactivity.

Confidence Assessment: High for the official Zambia visit, High Commission inauguration, memorandum and announced funding; Moderate for the reported special envoy vacancy and wider coordination implications; Moderate regarding future project implementation and commercial outcomes.

XIII. CHINA AND THE BROADER ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION

A. South Africa's Department of Science, Technology and Innovation announced on 9 November that Deputy Minister Nomalungelo Gina would lead a delegation to the China–Africa Innovation Cooperation and Development Forum in Wuhan from 10 to 13 November.

B. The programme addresses research, innovation and technological cooperation between African institutions and China. Areas identified include space technology, artificial intelligence, hydrogen energy, agriculture, mining, digital systems and advanced healthcare applications.

C. Activities scheduled for 11 November included engagement with Chinese science and technology representatives and discussions concerning space information technology and applied scientific cooperation. The programme emphasizes potential applications involving satellite information, agricultural monitoring, resource management and environmental protection.

D. These activities illustrate an important dimension of China's African engagement: the development of scientific and institutional relationships in addition to commercial trade and infrastructure. Technology cooperation can create long-term professional networks, but institutional meetings and future intentions should not be equated with operating research facilities or completed technology transfers.

E. China's engagement differs in scale and emphasis from the military logistics and security relationships highlighted in Russian reporting. Comparing these activities requires attention to the distinct effects of investment, trade, research cooperation, technical training and defence relationships.

F. Assessment. The November forum demonstrates continuing efforts to expand China–Africa technological cooperation. Its practical importance will depend upon whether participating institutions subsequently establish funded projects, research exchanges, technical capabilities and sustainable benefits consistent with their national priorities.

Confidence Assessment: High for the official South African announcement and scheduled forum activities; Moderate for the expected implementation of new technological initiatives and their long-term effects.

XIV. AFRICAN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

A. Recent developments demonstrate that African governments maintain diverse relationships with external partners. Military cooperation, commercial investment, public-health assistance and technical exchanges respond to different national priorities and do not necessarily imply exclusive geopolitical alignment.

B. South Africa's investigation into suspected foreign military recruitment illustrates the importance of domestic legal authority and cooperation with international law enforcement. Similarly, Kenyan–South African technical exchanges demonstrate the role of African institutions in developing their own professional capabilities.

C. Canada's Zambia engagement, China's scientific cooperation activities and United States commercial initiatives demonstrate differing forms of international partnership. Each requires separate assessment concerning implementation, national interests and institutional effectiveness.

D. Strategic autonomy is strengthened where governments retain effective oversight of military arrangements, financial commitments, natural resources, technical partnerships and

public safety. External cooperation can support these objectives when it respects national authority and reinforces domestic institutional capacity.

E. International intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation should therefore emphasize consent, lawful information sharing, clearly defined responsibilities and mutual institutional interests. Such an approach enables effective cooperation without suggesting that national authorities are incapable of managing their own security responsibilities.

F. Assessment. Africa's strategic environment cannot be reduced to competition among outside powers. National governments and regional institutions remain principal decision-makers. Durable partnerships are likely to depend upon institutional trust, measurable outcomes and respect for sovereignty.

Confidence Assessment: High for the documented diversity of African partnerships and national institutional responsibilities; Moderate regarding their future effectiveness and long-term strategic consequences.

XV. IMPLICATIONS AND PRIORITY INDICATORS FOR CANADA AND PARTNER GOVERNMENTS

A. Russian military activity should be assessed through documented personnel deployments, equipment deliveries, maritime logistics, financial relationships and the outcomes of security cooperation. Particular attention should be given to distinguishing commercial shipping, naval diplomatic engagement and confirmed military transport.

B. Foreign-national recruitment associated with the war in Ukraine requires continued cooperation among competent national authorities and international law-enforcement institutions. Investigative priorities include distinguishing voluntary participation from deception and trafficking, protecting affected individuals and maintaining reliable legal attribution.

C. In eastern Congo, priority indicators include changes in armed-group activity, civilian security, implementation of withdrawal arrangements, diplomatic negotiations, humanitarian access and compliance with existing commitments. Regional political claims should be evaluated against independently observable actions.

D. In the Sahel, relevant indicators include patterns of insurgent activity, protection of civilians, national institutional capacity, humanitarian displacement and the operational consequences of foreign military support. Military activity should be evaluated alongside governance and community security rather than treated as an isolated measure of effectiveness.

E. In the DRC Ebola response, priority measures include weekly confirmed cases, community deaths, contact-tracing performance, geographic expansion, clinical developments and cross-border preparedness. Public-health intelligence and security reporting should remain properly distinguished while supporting lawful interagency coordination.

F. Canada should maintain an implementation-based engagement framework, including the status of diplomatic appointments, approved programme financing, completed commercial initiatives, African technical partnerships and tangible results from government-supported trade activities.

G. The November Zambia commitments provide a practical basis for monitoring results. Priority measures should include project funding disbursed, institutional progress, commercial participation, local employment and the sustainability of economic and technical partnerships.

H. Assessment. The central analytical requirement is to move beyond the announcement of intentions and establish whether actions generate measurable outcomes. Effective **monitoring** should combine institutional records, independent reporting, economic indicators, humanitarian evidence and appropriately qualified security assessments.

XVI. OVERALL CONFIDENCE ASSESSMENT

A. High Confidence: Official South African arrest announcements, Canada's Zambia diplomatic activities and funding commitments, South African government reporting on the China–Africa technology forum, UNHCR displacement figures, dated WHO/CDC Ebola statistics, and documented diplomatic statements.

B. Moderate to High Confidence: The broader pattern of Russian naval diplomatic engagement, continuing regional insecurity, reported FRN military advances, foreign-national recruitment concerns and the diversity of African international partnerships.

C. Moderate Confidence: Reported Russian maritime logistics routes, the specific operational role of Africa Corps personnel in individual military activities, the expected effects of foreign military cooperation, and projections concerning the implementation of new political and commercial agreements.

D. Low to Moderate Confidence: Uncorroborated motives attributed to political figures, disputed internal political negotiations, projected military operations, and allegations contained principally in subscription-restricted reporting without supporting public documentation.

E. Methodological Qualification: Confidence in a report's publication or an institution's public statement does not necessarily establish the accuracy of every underlying allegation. Similarly, a publicly announced policy should not be represented as fully implemented unless the corresponding action has occurred.

XVII. CONCLUSION AND ANALYST'S OBSERVATION

A. RUSSIA. Russia continues to develop military, diplomatic and technical relationships with selected African governments. November reporting concerning Africa Corps logistics and naval engagement provides additional evidence of the breadth of these activities. Their strategic importance lies in operational sustainability, institutional relationships and

consequences for regional security. The available evidence does not establish uniform political alignment with Moscow.

B. UNITED STATES. The United States retains substantial financial, diplomatic and commercial instruments across Africa. The November discussions concerning the DRC strategic partnership and the United States statement on Angola demonstrate continuing engagement through infrastructure, investment and regional cooperation. The effectiveness of such arrangements will depend on financing, implementation and the priorities of participating governments.

C. CHINA. China's participation in scientific and technological cooperation provides a complementary dimension to its commercial relationships. The November Wuhan forum demonstrates continuing institutional engagement involving applied research and advanced technology. The significance of these activities should be measured through funded projects, professional exchanges and the development of sustainable technical capabilities.

D. CANADA. Canada's 8–10 November 2026 engagement in Zambia, including the formal reopening of its High Commission in Lusaka on 9 November, strengthens its resident diplomatic presence and bilateral cooperation in Southern Africa. The signing of an economic and development cooperation memorandum and the announcement of over C$10.5 million in funding support initiatives involving the Lobito Corridor, financial-sector oversight, energy infrastructure and women's participation in United Nations peacekeeping. These commitments advance Canada's interests in regional economic integration, critical minerals, institutional capacity and African-led peace and security initiatives. While the expanded diplomatic presence offers opportunities for closer political dialogue and regional cooperation, its long-term strategic significance will depend upon effective implementation, sustained partnerships and measurable outcomes.

E. AFRICA. African governments face varied military, economic and humanitarian challenges while retaining responsibility for their national priorities and international relationships. Effective external partnerships should reinforce domestic institutions, economic opportunity, civilian protection and professional security capabilities without limiting sovereign decision-making authority.

F. ANALYST'S OBSERVATION. The intersection of foreign military activity, transnational recruitment, irregular armed groups and regional humanitarian emergencies warrants sustained analytical attention. Effective cooperation should emphasize reliable evidence, coordination among authorized institutions and respectful diplomacy. Military intelligence, law enforcement and civilian authorities each possess complementary responsibilities that can contribute to better-informed security decisions while preserving established partnerships.

G. OVERALL ASSESSMENT. Africa’s evolving strategic environment is characterized by diverse national priorities, persistent security challenges and increasing interaction among external military, diplomatic and commercial relationships. A credible Canadian response should emphasize practical cooperation, verified evidence, institutional continuity and measurable implementation. Long-term strategic influence is more likely to be sustained

through reliable partnerships and demonstrable local benefits than through diplomatic visibility alone.

Overall Confidence Assessment: Moderate to High for documented November developments and established strategic relationships; Moderate for projected outcomes, operational influence and the comparative durability of international partnerships.

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Each year an Army Cadet graduate of the Basic Parachutist Course is awarded the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion Bursary by The Army Cadet League of Canada. This year is no exception and the bursary will be awarded again, tomorrow (24 July 2026). The Army Cadet League of Canada is able to present bursaries and scholarships to deserving cadets thanks to the generosity of our donors and partnering organizations. If you wish to help support an Army Cadet's pursuit of a post-secondary educations, please donate today. See photos:
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- Richard Foot
- August 5, 2026